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PERSPECTIVES ON LAWYERING
ARTICLES
SYMPTOMS EXPOSED WHEN LEGALISTS ENGAGE
IN MORAL DISCOURSE: REFLECTIONS ON THE
DIFFICULTIES OF TALKING ETHICS
James I. Elkins*
I. THE SYMPTOMS OF ETHICS TALK
This essay begins with a truism, or what might be called a
symptom of lawyer ethics: we have difficulty talking about our
ethics as lawyers, a difficulty that drives us toward a disdain for
ethics. We also have serious difficulties talking about and
interpreting the Constitution, but these interpretive difficulties
don't push us in the same direction as they do when it comes to
ethics. Indeed, we know there is going to be trouble when we
interpret the Constitution and we come away from those difficul-
ties with an increased appreciation for the complexity of the
interpretive task. One of the most striking features of efforts to
talk lawyer ethics and interpret the social text called "professional
responsibility" is that we come to such moral discourse as skeptics
and leave it with a hint of failure in the air.
We begin the moral discourse of lawyer ethics with skeptics
among us, expecting ethics talk to ring with hollow rhetoric in
contrast to the solid law talk encouraged in law school. But it is
not just moral skeptics who find ethics conversations problematic.
When we talk lawyer ethics we entangle, puzzle, confuse, intrigue,
and frighten each other. If you happen upon law students or
lawyers talking ethics, you will hear things that dishearten you.
Continue to listen and you may find that you are angered by what
you hear. Stay with the conversation and you may find your
anger turn to puzzlement. Probe the puzzlement and you will
want to know more about the difficulties of ethics talk.
* Professor, West Virginia University School of Law; LL.M. 1975, Yale Law School;
J.D. 1971, B.A. 1967, University of Kentucky.
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Physicians and their patients, confronted with illness, pay
close attention to symptoms. They assume that the symptoms tell
them something important they need to know. Psychotherapists
take a similar stance with those seeking counseling: the mid-
dle-aged corporate executive grown silent in his marriage, the
young woman obsessed about the food she eats, and the bright
high school student who no longer prepares class assignments and
receives failing grades. The physician and therapist honor the
symptoms by confronting them and taking them seriously. If we
are to understand the disordering symptoms we find in ethics
talk, we must approach the symptoms as a good physician would.
The interesting thing about ethics talk is that difficulties
arise over relatively simple things: how we will regard the truth,
whether we will avoid harm to others when we take up the
adversarial ethic, and whether our zealousness has any moral
limits other than those specifically provided by law and ethical
rules. We might note that lawyer ethics, treated as the law of
lawyering, produces some low-level symptoms, but they don't
amount to much, perhaps a mild headache, or a slight gnawing in
the stomach, or perpetual boredom. Or no symptom at all. The
symptoms of dis-ease and dis-order that I report here are most
likely to appear when we take lawyer ethics seriously as ethics.'
If you inquire into lawyer ethics as a study of the body of ethical
rules prescribed for ethical wrongdoing, you are unlikely to see or
experience the symptomatic difficulties of ethics talk. The
paradox of ethics talk is that it makes the symptoms of our
underlying ethical disorders visible only when we talk seriously2
about who we are as lawyers, how we have gotten to be this way,
and how our notions of lawyering lead us astray. To realize the
hope and possibility in ethics talk, to get at what we want from
1. The legal educator most responsible for this effort has been Thomas Shaffer. See
THOMAS L. SHAFFER, ON BEING A CHRISTIAN AND A LAWYER: LAW FOR THE INNOCENT
(1981); THOMAS L. SHAFFER, AMERICAN LEGAL ETHICS (1985); THOMAS L. SHAFFER, FAITH
AND THE PROFESSIONS (1987); THOMAS L. SHAFFER & MARY M. SHAFFER, AMERICAN
LAWYERS AND THEIR COMMUNITIES (1991); see also, e.g., DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND
JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY (1988); THE GOOD LAWYER: LAWYERS' ROLES AND LAWYERS'
ETHICS (David Luban ed., 1983).
2. The kind of serious talk I have in mind is best exemplified by Socrates in the
dialogues given to us by Plato, particularly the early dialogues. See, e.g., PLATO, GORGIAS
(Walter Hamilton trans., 1960) [hereinafter PLATO, GORGIAS]; PLATO, PROTAGORAS: A
SOCRATIC COMMENTARY (B.A.F. Hubbard & E.S. Kornofsky trans., Univ. of Chicago Press
1982) [hereinafter PLATO, PROTAGORAS].
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ethics, and to make ethics real, we have to take the symptoms of
ethics talk seriously.
The work with symptoms of ethical dis-ease is, in some ways,
like that of a physician or psychotherapist, and reflects the
philosophical stance described in Robert Pirsig's Zen and the Art
of Motorcycle Maintenance.3  Pirsig's popular narrative-part
autobiography, part novel, part philosophical treatise, part
travelogue-is educative in many ways.4 Most relevant here is
his poignant, sensible, grounded, philosophical account of how we
get into difficulty over relatively simple things; for example, how
we maintain the motorcycles we ride. For Pirsig, talking about
motorcycles is a lateral and metaphoric way of talking about self
and culture, and about philosophy. The "motorcycle" I work on in
this essay is the self we use in becoming lawyers. Like all
motorcycles, it runs hot and cold, it breaks down, it needs repair.
To get us where we are going, the self that finds expression in
ethics talk needs maintenance. Ethics is a kind of repair work we
do when we talk about how lawyers are to care for their character
as they care for their clients' concerns and their clients' ethics.
The narrator of Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance5
is a motorcycle aficionado, a love that he shares with his friends
Sylvia and John. They ride and talk motorcycles together. They
are drawn to motorcycles and to each other the way lawyers,
pilots, ham radio operators, and coin collectors get together and
talk. The narrator/protagonist runs into a problem with John and
Sylvia. They don't really know anything about motorcycles,
except how to ride them. They don't pay attention to how the
machine runs; they don't know what to do or what it means when
it runs hot or cold, and they don't understand enough about the
3. ROBERT M. PIRSIG, ZEN AND THE ART OF MOTORCYCLE MAINTENANCE: AN INQUIRY
INTO VALUES (New Age ed. 1981) (1974). Pirsig's philosophical narrative now has a sequel.
See ROBERT M. PIRSIG, LILA: AN INQUIRY INTO MORALS (1991).
4. See, e.g., Richard B. Parker, A Review ofZen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance
with Some Remarks on the Teaching of Law, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 318 (1976) (on the
educational possibilities of Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance in legal education).
5. I speak here of the narrator of Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance not from
any desire to be a sophisticated literary critic, but to avoid a misreading of Pirsig and the
story he tells. Stylistically, it would be easier to refer to the narrator as if he were
speaking for the author, Robert Pirsig. The narrator of the story, however, does not
identify himself as the author, and the reader may need to account for this fact.
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machine not to create problems for themselves and anyone who
rides with them. The narrator, on the other hand, not only rides
the motorcycle, but sees the need to care for the machine, to
understand how it works, and how the failures of the machine can
be understood and carefully corrected.
The narrator characterizes the problem that he has with John
and Sylvia over motorcycle maintenance as a "minor difference."
It could, with some effort, be overlooked. We all have occasion to
overlook, look around, or beyond, a difference like this. It's how
we learn to get along, be accepted, and belong.7 The narrator of
this philosophical tale of motorcycle maintenance can't seem to do
this. Yes, he tries, but he finds the problem with John and Sylvia
gnawing at him. The problem just won't go away. He says, "it's
like discovering a tooth with a missing filling. You can never
leave it alone. You have to probe it, work around it, push on it,
think about it, not because it's enjoyable but because it's on your
mind and it won't get off your mind."8
Instead of seeking technologically compatible, machine-savvy
friends to ride motorcycles with, the narrator uses his friends'
limited understanding of their motorcycles as an opening, an
invitation to spin a philosophical tale about the big differences we
experience with each other (and within ourselves) in our culture.
Pirsig's tale is exemplary not only as a story of friendship and
what we can learn with the help of our friends and their symp-
toms, but also for demonstrating how it is possible to do philoso-
phy by staying with rather than moving away from annoying and
puzzling minor differences. Pirsig has his narrator work on just
such a difference by pushing at it, staying with it, turning it over
and over, and linking it up with other things he sees in John's
and Sylvia's lives and in his own.
Pirsig does philosophy in a way suggestive of what lawyers
who take their ethics seriously might do;9 he hangs on to what
6. PIRSIG, supra note 3, at 9.
7. See infra note 108 and accompanying text.
8. PIRSIG, supra note 3, at 10.
9. Do your routines and everyday activities link to "a view with sufficient generality
and clarity to guide you and to place the immediate context of your action in a broader
setting"? ROBERTO M. UNGER, SOCIAL THEORY: ITS SITUATION AND ITS TASK 77 (1987).
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could be ignored, trying to align various observations about John
and Sylvia so that he can put a name to their attitude, to the
vision of reality that makes it possible for them and others of
their generation to eschew any understanding of technology. John
and Sylvia are with technology the way some law students are
with ethics: They don't claim to know anything about it and don't
want to learn any more than they must. They don't see any need
to learn anything about what they don't know. Their aptitude for
understanding the problem is turned against understanding.
When they try to learn, they get blocked.
Even when we do know something-about motorcycles, about
ethics-we can still act like we don't care. Pirsig tells several
stories of the narrator's experience with motorcycle mechanics.
These are the people with expertise in motorcycle maintenance.
The mechanics that work on Pirsig's motorcycle are:
Good-natured, friendly, easy-going-and uninvolved. They
were like spectators. You had the feeling they had just
wandered in there [to the shop] themselves and somebody had
handed them a wrench. There was no identification with the
job. No saying, "I am a mechanic." At 5 P.M. or whenever
their eight hours were in, you knew they would cut it off and
not have another thought about their work. They were already
trying not to have any thoughts about their work on the job.
In their own way they were... living with technology without
really having anything to do with it. Or rather, they had
something to do with it, but their own selves were outside of it,
detached, removed. They were involved in it but not in such
a way as to care. 10
These motorcycle mechanics regard the motorcycles they repair
the way some students regard ethics: it's just a job, something
that must be done, tolerated, and endured, knowing always that
life is elsewhere.
Ethics must help one move from the specifics of everyday life and the ethics that
surround us to the global (what philosophers have called the universal) and then back. It
is the humanities, says James Boyd White, that lawyers might use "to begin to think in
more than one language, more than one voice, and thus to locate the particular practices
of a discourse [in this case, legal discourse] in the larger context of the rest of what we
know and are." James B. White, Economics and Law: Two Cultures in Tension, 54 TENN.
L. REV. 161, 199 (1987).
10. PIRSIG, supra note 3, at 24.
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During the long motorcycle trip that makes up the travelogue
of Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance, Pirsig describes
another encounter, this one of a different tone. The chain guard
on the motorcycle has broken, and the narrator tries without
success to find a replacement. He decides to repair the old one.
He finds a welder's shop: "Cleanest welding place I've ever seen.
Great high trees and deep grass line an open space in back, giving
a kind of village-smithy appearance. All the tools are hung up
with care, everything tidy, but no one is home."1 When he
returns later to find the welder, he turns out to be:
[A]n old man in his sixties or seventies .... I explain about
the chain guard and after a while he says, "I'm not taking it off
for you. You'll have to take it off."
I do this and show it to him, and he says, "It's full of
grease."
I find a stick out in back under the spreading chestnut tree
and scrape all the grease into a trash barrel. From a distance
he says, "There's some solvent in that pan over there." I see
the flat pan and get out the remaining grease with some leaves
and the solvent.
When I show it to him he nods and slowly goes over and
sets the regulators for his gas torch. Then he looks at the tip
and selects another one. Absolutely no hurry. He picks up a
steel filler rod and I wonder if he's actually going to try to weld
that thin metal. Sheet metal I don't weld. I braze it with a
brass rod. When I try to weld it I punch holes in it and then
have to patch them up with huge blobs of filler rod. "Aren't
you going to braze it?" I ask.
"No," he says. Talkative fellow.
He sparks the torch, and sets a tiny little blue flame and
then, it's hard to describe, actually dances the torch and the
rod in separate little rhythms over the thin sheet metal, the
whole spot a uniform luminous orange-yellow, dropping the
torch and filler rod down at the exact right moment and then
removing them. No holes. You can hardly see the weld.
"That's beautiful," I say.
"One dollar," he says, without smiling. Then I catch a
funny quizzical look within his glance. Does he wonder if he's
overcharged? No, something else . . . lonely, same as the
11. Id. at 319.
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waitress. Probably he thinks I'm bullshitting him. Who
appreciates work like this anymore?12
One of the educative powers of reading comes when we hook
up the problem in the story, the problem of the story, to the
problem or story that has taken up an annoying presence in the
life we are trying to live. Something of this sort happens to
me-thinking about the difficulties I encounter with students and
lawyers who try to engage each other in ethics talk 3-when I
re-read Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance. Maybe this
problem of how we are to care and maintain motorcycles is a good
working metaphor for lawyer ethics.
Some lawyers and law teachers, and some law students, know
the stuff of ethics firsthand. They take pleasure in what they
know, and how they live with this knowledge. Others seem to get
on, and get along, in life, riding along if you will, without much
explicit knowledge of how ethics works, even the ethics in their
own lives. Like John and Sylvia, they don't seem to realize the
cost of their lack of knowledge. They get by all right. After all,
you don't have to know anything about ethics to be a success, or
to become a lawyer, or to practice law. Ethical concern, ethical
sensibilities, and ethical awareness are, in reality, not prerequi-
sites to becoming or being a lawyer. Students of legal ethics know
this even if they do not publicly proclaim it. Sometimes they fear
it and rage about it, but there it is for all to see, to know, and to
talk about, if one has the courage.
It would be possible to pass over and get around the difficul-
ties we have with each other about ethics. Some troubles you can
avoid by just walking away from them. The narrator in Pirsig's
tale could have found new friends. Yet he found his minor
differences with John and Sylvia bearing on his mind, something
to puzzle over. Curiosity, if nothing else, sometimes prevents us
12. Id. at 320-21.
13. I had no idea when I began teaching legal ethics in 1977 as a young law teacher
that it was a course one taught only at the insistence of the dean, or that the course would
be particularly difficult to teach. There was no forewarning that teaching legal ethics
would put me on a collision course with students (and more than one dean) who thought
legal ethics should be taught as if it were the law of lawyering, and entangle me in




from walking away from a problem like this. You don't have to be
a philosopher to experience the need to understand (and solve)
one of these everyday life problems.
There are many ways, some more honest than others, to
insure that our minor ethical differences don't escalate into
anything serious.14 One way to do this is to focus on legal ethics
as the study of a body of ethical rules. By examining a set of
ethical dilemmas that lawyers face (or think they face) and
examining how the ethical rules of the profession are applied in
the resolution of these dilemmas, you have a typical law school
course on legal ethics. This legalistic, quandary-driven approach
to legal ethics keeps both teacher and student on relatively safe
ground. A teacher of legal ethics can walk away from the
skepticism and disdain that students have for ethics talk by
simply translating lawyer ethics talk into law talk.
If you move in the other direction and take up the talk of
lawyer ethics as ethics and moral discourse, you find yourself in
a paradoxical world where black and white compete always with
gray, gray, gray. There is no end of gray, in many shades and
colorations, in ethics talk. There are so many ways to talk about
the gray areas of ethics that I am reminded of the Eskimos and
their many words for snow.
In lawyer ethics talk there is much to engage us, but also
much to infuriate us. Some participants in conversations about
lawyer ethics celebrate ethics because it makes us more attentive
and reflective about our professional lives. Others, fearful of
where all this ethical talk might lead, practice silence: a silence
of doubt and frustration, and, at times, a silence of anger and
rage.15 How are these competing visions of ethics talk in legal
14. This world of moral gray, and the ethical discourse that explores this world, is
rooted in a world of love and hate, and right and wrong, and it gives rise to feelings of
possibility---caring, working together, figuring things out, pulling together pieces of a
personal puzzle-shadowed by a sense of futility and impending failure.
15. Traveling this route, you are soon reminded that talking ethics is futile. You can't,
we are told, change anyone's mind about moral matters, and it's a wasted effort to try.
Besides, there are dark overtones to all this talk about ethics: whose ethics? The problem
in the background in all ethics talk is dogma and indoctrination: "Be like me." "Believe
like me." With these concerns about ethics talk in mind, we keep our own counsel about
ethics; we let others do the arguing. When confronted with ethics talk, the temptation is
to slip off. We set off on our own way. But then, if we don't talk ethics, matters just get
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education to be interpreted? What do they teach us about lawyer
ethics? Others are pulled incrementally, one way and then the
other. Yes, the way we talk about ethics matters;16 no, I'm
afraid it doesn't. One resolution is to anchor ourselves and just
not sail at all!
Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance draws attention
to the way we encounter differences and difficulties-whether
owning, riding, and maintaining a motorcycle, or in a professional
life-when we confront the symptoms that reveal our cultural
disorders. One wonders whether it would be possible to do for
ethics what Pirsig did for motorcycle maintenance. Can we take
the differences and difficulties that arise in lawyer ethics talk (in
and out of the classroom) and treat them as symptoms of deeper
problems of the culture of lawyering? Pirsig worries about the
culture, even as he diagnoses its ills. Can those who are curious
about lawyer ethics do something of this sort? Is it not concern
and curiosity about culture, in our case the culture of lawyering,
that draws us to ethics? We are not drawn to ethics because of its
glamour, or the glory bestowed upon those who take ethics
seriously. We take up lawyer ethics because we have an unarticu-
lated sense that something is wrong, that we are drifting, and
being pulled by strong currents into dangerous waters.
In this essay, I do not present a program for how we might fix
the culture of lawyering or offer a comprehensive account of the
moral drift that is the subject of concern in the profession.'7 My
purpose here is a modest one: to examine the difficulties that
arise when students of law are confronted with lawyer ethics talk
that is not reduced to a discussion of the rules of ethics. Taking
up the symptoms of lawyer moral discourse one cannot escape the
failures and dead-ends that are its subject. I offer up what I can
worse. In this sense, marriage talk and ethics talk share some similarities.
16. There is a sense, at times, that we really do need to talk about ethics. We do seem
to need an antidote to the moral drift that we observe and experience in the legal
profession. To arrest the drift, we must talk about where we are going and what happens
when we become lawyers.
17. Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance does not provide us with a cookbook
for fixing the failures of the legal profession or even the failures of motorcycle mainte-
nance. It does, however, provide a manual of sorts, a manual on how we deal with
symptoms of cultural disorder and how we get conned into seeing the world the way we
do and the traps that keep us from seeing better, seeing more, seeing wisely.
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and pull it together as I do, not to offer any kind of ultimate
description, or proven antidote, but to see what an attitude of
resistance to ethics talk looks like under close scrutiny in the law
school classroom. Instead of turning away from the minor
differences we encounter when we talk lawyer ethics, I amplify
them, and treat them as if they were symptoms rather than
semantical misunderstandings.
The obstacles to moral discourse provide the best opening we
have to understanding what is really ailing us. In the study of
ethics talk, we are like the physician who confronts an array of
symptoms. The symptoms can be interpreted differently: they
may point to nothing of serious concern and pass in due time, or
the symptoms may point to a matter of grave concern to the
future health of the patient. The wise physician is always
discarding symptoms: "No, this is not of concern now, don't worry
about it, everything will be all right." The failure to know when
to discard a symptom embroils us needlessly in a cure for
problems that are not serious. The physician's other move is
equally and vitally important: "We will keep an eye on this
symptom, it may point to something seriously wrong and we will
need to address it medically to avert serious problems."
In this essay, I report some of the symptoms I detect in law
school versions of lawyer ethics talk. I will spare the reader
descriptions of those symptoms that turned out, after watchful
days, to point to nothing serious, for example, the kind of minor
differences we can bear with equanimity. I present those features
of moral discourse that seem most likely to indicate deeper
cultural pathologies, symptoms that a physician of ethics would
want to talk to a patient about, symptoms it would be wiser to
address than walk away from.
II. GETTING A FEEL FOR ETHICS TALK
The symptoms of moral disarray are most pronounced, most
visible, and most accessible when we engage each other in what
362 [Vol. 17:353
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I call ethics talk."8 The symptoms and difficulties of serious
lawyer ethics talk are muted when ethical dilemmas are subjected
to a problem-Esolving analysis using the Model Rules of Profession-
al Conduct and the Code of Professional Responsibility.'9 We can
use our problem-solving abilities to deal with ethical problems,
but we need to be careful lest we assume that a lawyer's ethics
can be solved by finding the right rule. °
What, then, is ethics talk? What does the conversation of
ethics sound like? I begin with the assumption that ethics talk,
18. In this essay, I use the idea of ethics talk, the conversation ethics, and moral
discourse, without trying to distinguish, categorize, or define them. This may violate an
unwritten law of respectable scholarship and signal an ignorance of analytical approaches
to moral philosophy. Later in this essay I identify the effort to define ethics as one of the
symptoms of ethics talk. See infra part VII.
I turn away from definitions because I find that they stunt ethics talk. Those who
demand definitions most are most likely to use the definitions to derail ethics talk.
Definitions may help us talk about ethics and, at the same time, keep the talk always at
arm's length from what we want the talk to do.
One might distinguish ethics talk, the conversation ethics, and moral discourse by
charting out the origins of these terms and showing how the terms take on meaning
through the context of their extended use by identified participants or users of the terms.
Using this scheme, ethics talk would be traced to the renewed interest in rhetoric and how
our talk (even talk so informal as gossip) is used to persuade others about notions of moral
goodness. The conversation ethics can be traced to those who seek to re-vision a more de-
centralized, participatory, dialectical approach to matters as disparate as philosophy and
politics, literature and law. Moral discourse, then, might be viewed as a more formal,
structured inquiry with an eye to the philosophical practices of Foucault and Habermas.
Let me confess here to having made no such distinctions as those suggested
previously. (Some readers will be distracted by my failure to do so.) I use the term "ethics
talk" because this is where I see ethics most visibly in action. If ethics is a way of talking,
and our talk is where we see ethics at work, being rehearsed, experimented. with, and
performed, then ethics talk might be a serious but accessible way into a subject-a set of
concerns, a way of living-that is not so easy to get at by more refined, academic means.
Or, start in the other direction with the more academic-sounding notion of moral
discourse. Once you get around the discourse gurus-Foucault and Habermas, and the
style of European philosophy they practice-discourse turns out, by way of dictionary
definition, to include the ideas of argument, conversation, and talk. Consequently, I use
talk, conversation, and discourse as interchangeable terms, terms that can be defined best
by performance in contexts created by those who set out to inquire into ethics and how
ethics finds its way into the practice of law.
19. See generally SELECTED STATUTES, RULES AND STANDARDS ON THE LEGAL
PROFESSION (John S. Dzienkowski ed., 1992).
20. There may be symptoms of one sort or another when we attempt to solve ethical
problems using legal skills, but these symptoms point to problems with legal reasoning,
rather than a problem with ethics. When we read judicial opinions and use the law we
extract from these opinions to solve a case with different facts, we confront problems of
legal interpretation that generate their own recognizable symptoms. It is not the
symptoms of law talk, but ethics talk that concerns me here.
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ethics language, and ethics rhetoric are all around us. It's hard
to imagine anyone not hearing it and not responding to it. We
don't have to know exactly what it is, or call it "ethics," to be
engaged in ethics talk. Whether we call it ethics or not, we are
more or less conscious of this dimension of our everyday lives.21
The only way to be free of ethics, its talk, its language, and its
rhetoric, is to be a hermit. Morals and ethics are constant fare in
daily newspapers, television evening news, and conversations with
friends. Ethics talk is indeed all around us. We are knee-deep in
it, doing it, using it in our thinking, or struggling to live, so we
don't think about it.
We are in the web of ethics talk because our lives have
direction and they go astray; we see how some directions in life
take more character and yield more Quality22 than others. Our
lives inevitably have a qualitative dimension-they are better or
worse lives depending on how we engage each other, how we
engage our work, and how we engage ourselves. This qualitative
dimension of life is not easily translated into a subject for an
ethics course or a set of lectures on professionalism; it is not
easily described or explained. Yet, it moves in and out of our
daily talk like the weather, gossip, and politics.
Getting a sense of ethics from the talk going on around us
requires a good ear, curiosity, a novelist's eye for the use and
misuse of language, the courage of an anthropologist doing field
work in Sumatra, and appreciation for puzzle, paradox, and
mystery. Most of us don't have ready access to all these qualities
and skills, and so we don't know how to get from the ethics talk
around us to ethics talk that would be educative in a moral sense.
After all, talk is cheap, and action speaks louder than words. We
bump up against this old adage; we mistrust words when it comes
to ethics. Rightfully so. We are all, if we have an eye for reality,
suspicious about ethics talk. This means it is going to be difficult
21. JEFFREY STOUT, ETHICS AFTER BABEL: THE LANGUAGES OF MORALS AND THEIR
DISCONTENTS 71 (1988) ("the moral language we use in daily life has much to do with what
life is like, with what we are like").
22. I use "Quality" here in the sense that Robert Pirsig uses it in his philosophical
narrative. See generally PIRSIG, supra note 3.
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to get any respect for ethics talk. We begin ethics talk with a low-
grade fever if not more pronounced symptoms. 3
We may be suspicious of ethics talk but we continue to do it:
we parade our moral sensibilities out into public view, and we
pick up more of our morals and ethics from what we bear around
us than we would like to admit. Indeed, one way we get our
ethics is listening to others,24 watching what they do and how
they talk about what they do, and watching and listening to the
relation of talk and action. Ethics talk is a kind of self-review or
self-rehearsal, using the scripts provided by others and those we
have written ourselves. We talk one way and then another,
listening to how our speaking sounds, watching and attending to
the reactions it receives out in the world, calculating our rhetori-
cal successes and failures. We talk to justify the way we live.
If this assessment of ethics talk and our relation to it, with it,
and against it is accurate, then one might see ethics talk itself as
one way, among others, that we can use to learn ethics actively.
We might even find that the ethics in our everyday talk, conversa-
tions, and dialogues-the ethics in classroom, hallway, and lounge
talk, the talk we do with our friends, colleagues, neighbors, and
teachers--can itself be taught. It can be self-taught (self-learned),
and it can be taught to us by others. Socrates was a teacher of
this kind of ethics, the ethics we already have and are always
rehearsing in the everyday scripts of our life dramas.2"
23. We suspect ethics talk is a facade. We have learned not to trust what we hear.
We are by ethics the way some parents are by their children, the way some employees are
by their employers, and the way some students are by their teachers; they keep their eye
on the action and distrust the word.
24. THOMAS NAGEL, MORTAL QUESTIONS xiii (Canto ed. 1991) (1979) ("People have to
be ready to listen, and that is not determined by argument.").
25. One of the oddities of teaching law students professional responsibility and lawyer
ethics is that the kind ofteaching Socrates inspired-remember that Socrates-is the patron
saint of legal education-is so noticeably absent. Law students begin their study of lawyer
ethics not with Protagoras or Gorgias, Plato's Socratic dialogues pointedly relevant to those
who set out to become lawyers, but with a set of professionally derived rules of ethical
conduct. The failure of these rules to arrest the moral drift of the legal profession, or to
satisfy the fantasy that positivist problem-solving (on the model of legal problem-solving)
can be used to solve moral dilemmas, has still not brought law school legal ethics teachers
back around to Socrates. But see Thomas D. Eisele, Must Virtue Be Taught?, 37 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 495 (1987); John 0. Cole, The Socratic Method in Legal Education: Moral Discourse
and Accommodation, 35 MERCER L. REV. 867 (1984); James B. White, The Ethics of
Argument: Plato's Gorgias and the Modern Lawyer, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 849 (1983); Anthony
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One of the ways we learn ethics, and indeed one of the ways
we know ethics, is in the talk we do with each other, talk that
sometimes takes a qualitative, philosophical turn, talk that
sometimes appears as no more than collegial banter. Steven
Tipton observes that "[t]he moral sense we make of our lives, and
of one another, takes the form of discourse about what is good,
which acts are right, and who is virtuous."2" Our moral sensibil-
ities are engaged by the talkative scrutiny of acts we feel (or learn
to feel) are not right and of lives that take non-virtuous paths.
We argue about what is right, how we ought to feel, and what
outcome is morally desirable; when we do so with the idea of
educating ourselves and others, we engage in what might be
called moral discourse.
Robert Pirsig in Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance
engages the reader in moral discourse. Pirsig argues that we
have different visions of reality and that we learn how these
visions work and what they mean when we take minor differences
seriously-trying to get to the bottom of the symptoms we find in
our relations with friends and with ourselves. Lawyers, too, have
differences, and our differences about ethics remain minor only
when we subject them to the numbing un-reality that equates
ethics to a set of ethical rules read and interpreted like legal
rules. The symptom/pathology/shadow side of legal ethics and the
ethics talk that breaks out when we put aside the notion that
lawyer ethics equals a set of ethical rules of conduct, are vividly
portrayed in Seymour Wishman's Confessions of a Criminal
Lawyer.27 Wishman begins his Confessions with a story of a
screaming woman who confronts him in a Newark hospital
lobby.28 Wishman later realizes that the woman was a victim in
a rape case in which he had acted as defense counsel for the
T. Kronman, Foreword: Legal Scholarship and Moral Education, 90 YALE L.J. 955, 959-67
(1981) (discussing Gorgias and the nature of advocacy); James R. Elkins, Socrates and the
Pedagogy of Critique, 14 LEGAL STUD. F. 231 (1990); Richard K Neumann, Jr., A
Preliminary Inquiry into the Art of Critique, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 725 (1989).
26. STEVEN M. TIPTON, GETTING SAVED FROM THE SIXTIES xiv (1982).
27. SEYMOUR WISHMAN, CONFESSIONS OF A CRIMINAL LAWYER (Penguin Books 1982)
(1981). For a condensed version of Wishman's Confessions, useful in the pedagogy of moral
discourse, see id. at 3-18.
28. Id. at 3-5. Wishman's use of a story, and my use of that story here, is a reminder
that our ethics are always linked to our stories. See GERARD FOUREZ, LIBERATION ETHICS
43-52 (David Morris et al. trans., 1982) (a political perspective on the relation of stories of
ethics).
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accused. It was Wishman's humiliation during cross-examination
of the woman, Mrs. Lewis, who now confronts him, that suggests
in a dramatic way that something has gone wrong.
Wishman tells the story about Mrs. Lewis in a way that asks
us, as readers, lawyers, and empathic human beings, to take
account of how he (and we) can justify the humiliation of a woman
like Mrs. Lewis, a witness whom Wishman believed was telling
the truth when she testified that she had not willingly engaged in
sex with Wishman's client. Can lawyers, in good conscience and
with justification provided by their professional ethics, humiliate
a witness whom they believe is telling the truth? Wishman sets
out to explain the humiliation of Mrs. Lewis during his cross-ex-
amination, but his explanation does not resolve his distress when
he reflects on the harm it caused. In harming Mrs. Lewis,
Wishman begins to see that he has harmed himself. He finds
that he can no longer simply justify what he has done with what
he calls "flippant" philosophical excuses.29 Wishman uses the
encounter with Mrs. Lewis to begin to honor the symptoms of his
moral situation.3 °
29. WISHMAN, supra note 27, at 17. Wayne Booth has observed that:
[11n a world that talks of the threat of alienation and the loss of community,
we have found a community that everyman [and every woman] can assent to:
as old as Adam and as new as the morning's newscast, it is the community of
those who want to discover good reasons together.
WAYNE C. BOOTH, MODERN DOGMA AND THE RHETORIC OF ASSENT 203 (1974); see also
PHILIPPA FOOT, VIRTUES AND VICES AND OTHER ESSAYS IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY 96 (1978)
("The fact that moral judgments need defense seems to distinguish the impact of one man's
[or one woman's] moral views upon others from mere persuasion or coercion, and the
judgments themselves from mere expressions of likes and dislikes."); JURGEN HABERMAS,
MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND COMMUNICATVE ACTION 19 (Christian Lenhardt & Shierry W.
Nicholsen trans., 1990) ("Everyday communication makes possible a kind of understanding
that is based on claims to validity and thus furnishes the only real alternative to exerting
influence on one another in more or less coercive ways.").
30. WISHMAN, supra note 27; see also JOHN DEWEY, RECONSTRUCTION IN PHILOSOPHY
163-64 (Beacon Press 1957) (1920).
A moral situation is one in which judgment and choice are required anteced-
ently to overt action. The practical meaning of the situation-that is to say the
action needed to satisfy it-is not self-evident. It has to be searched for. There
are conflicting desires and alternative apparent goods. What is needed is to
find the right course of action, the right good. Hence, inquiry is exacted:
observation of the detailed makeup of the situation; analysis into its diverse
factors; clarification of what is obscure; discounting of the more insistent and
vivid traits; tracing the consequences of the various modes of actions that
suggest themselves; regarding the decision reached as hypothetical and
tentative until the anticipated or supposed consequences which led to its
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We cannot understand Wishman's humiliation of Mrs. Lewis,
or whether Wishman was right to do what he did, until we find
out how we are going to talk about Wishman, his character, and
his explanation of what he has done. Before we can know what
kind of moral universe we have made for ourselves with the roles
we imagine lawyers to play, we must find out what we will do and
say about Wishman's moral character and the moral problem we
face when we take zealousness to the lengths that Wishman
portrays in his Confessions.31
In moral discourse with Wishman (about Wishman, zealous-
ness, humiliation, and the role of the lawyer) we question
ourselves, our world, our ethics: How does the legal mind-set
we bring to our talk about lawyer ethics work? How do we, as
insiders, understand and attempt to justify an adversarial ethic
that immunizes lawyers (at least in our own view) from the moral
consequences of adversarialism? And how are we, as lawyers, to
understand the character of our work or our character as lawyers,
if we reject the facile explanations of the moral rhetoric used to
justify questionable professional practices? It is with moral
discourse that we begin to see how we both routinely and
unconsciously portray a moral universe in the language we use to
account for what we do as lawyers. Indeed, we begin to see that
we are powerless to rid our language and thoughts about law of
moral implication and consequence.
Seymour Wishman's Confessions of a Criminal Lawyer is an
autobiographical account of lawyering that pushes us to re-exam-
ine the explanations that lawyers use to justify the hard-ball
tactics that accompany an unreflective reverence for the ad-
versarial ethic. (Tactics defended, ironically, in the name of legal
ethics.) It is in our struggle to understand Wishman's behavior,
and our own practices as lawyers, that we bring together law
adoption have been squared with actual consequences.
Id.
31. One way to describe Wishman's conduct is that he has been ruthless. We must
examine how such ruthless conduct is to play out in our public lives as lawyers. See
NAGEL, supra note 24, at 75-90 (describing ruthlessness in public life).
32. Peter Elbow observes that "[lianguage is the principal medium that allows you to
interact with yourself.... A principle value of language, therefore, is that it permits you
to distance yourself from your own perceptions, feelings, and thoughts." PETER ELBOW,
WRITING WITHOUT TEACHERS 55 (1973).
368 [Vol. 17:353
Difficulties of Talking Ethics
school course conversations, lawyer ethics talk propelled by an eye
on ethical rules, and what sophisticates like to call "moral
discourse." Moral discourse presents not only a philosophical
issue but a practical one: how does ethics work and how can we
use ethics talk to help us see what kind of lawyer we have set out
to be? An education in ethics talk moves toward an understand-
ing. of how these questions work and how our working with them
can change our moral identities and professional lives. When we
learn to engage each other in moral dialogue and observe the
obstacles to moral discourse we will have set about a re-imagining
of lawyer ethics.
Ethics, then, is less a course of study or a body of knowledge,
and more a course of conversation that implicates each of us in a
life we are already living and a future we must imagine. With
Socrates as our guide, a study of ethics would focus on what
happens when we talk about ourselves as lawyers, our legalistic
modes of thinking about the world, how being a lawyer affects our
moral sensibilities and imaginations,33 and how our ethics as
lawyers gets played out in the communities where we practice.
When we take ethics talk seriously, it becomes a pragmatic
matter of learning to talk about professional life so that we can
figure out how to live.34 I talk about ethics to say what I see, to
see how I am blind to my own faults and deceptions,3 5 and to
33. The ways that we imagine the world of ethics talk shape the world of lawyering
practices. There is always an image of the lawyer at work and at play in legal ethics and
ethics talk. The images and ethical talk we create in turn create us.
34. We talk with each other about ethics when we seek, in our own way and in ways
common to our education and culture, to have the world take us seriously:
[W]e all have an obligation to ourselves and to each other to try to make sense
of our lives in deciding to what ends we will use our legal skills. In becoming
a professional, we do not stop being human. As humans we have some
responsibility to work toward objectives that seem to us useful.
Sylvia A. Law, Afterword: The Purpose of Professional Education, in LOOKING AT LAW
SCHOOL 205, 212 (Stephen Gillers ed., 1977).
35. Stanley Hauerwas has observed that:
Contrary to our dominant presumptions, we are seldom conscious of what
we are doing or who we are. We choose to stay ignorant of certain engage-
ments with the world, for to put them all together often asks too much of us,
and sometimes threatens the more enjoyable engagements. We profess
sincerity and normally try to abide by that profession, yet we neglect to acquire
the very skills which will test that profession of sincerity against our current
performance. On the contrary, we deliberately allow certain engagements to
go unexamined, quite aware that areas left unaccountable tend to cater to self-
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imagine more concretely what I must see if I want to get from
where I am now to where I should be going. I must learn to talk
about the ethics around me and the ethics I embrace.
When we talk ethics in this serious way we find out to what
and to whom we have become blind: to the harms of a humiliat-
ing cross-examination of a truthful witness like Mrs. Lewis and
the harms to ourselves of professing mis-practices in the name of
ethics. If the aim of ethics is moral sensibility in the practice of
law, then ethical inquiry must take as its subject who we are, how
we live, and how we address ourselves in justifying the practices
and lives that we claim to be morally (socially, politically, and
spiritually) worthwhile.36 Without the education of ethics talk,
we lose sight of who we are and what we are becoming.
III. A PHILOSOPHY OF MORAL DISCOURSE
We begin moral discourse by being attentive to the way we
already talk. We start with what we already know, imagine,
dream, and fear. Hanna Pitkin describes the path we follow:
Instead of studying moral rules or principles or traditional
systems of morality, the teachings of religious leaders or
philosophers. . . . [we ordinary-language philosophers] are
interested in the way moral discourse functions in everyday
life, how we ordinarily talk about moral matters. For it is in
interest. As a result of that inertial policy, the condition of self-deception
becomes the rule rather than the exception in our lives, and often in the
measure that we are trying to be honest and sincere.
STANLEY HAUERWAS, TRUTHFULNESS AND TRAGEDY 82 (1977).
36. The philosophical approach reflected in this essay is similar to that of Thomas
Nagel in his introduction to philosophy. Nagel argues that "[t]he center of philosophy lies
in certain questions which the reflective human mind finds naturally puzzling, and the
best way to begin the study of philosophy is to think about them directly." THOMAS NAGEL,
WHAT DOES IT ALL MEAN?: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 4 (1987). "It is,"
Maurice Natanson reminds us, "the character of engagement [in and with the world] rather
than a theory" of the "purpose or importance" of engagement that concerns a phenomeno-
logical and existentialistic approach to philosophy and moral discourse. MAURICE
NATANSON, THE JOURNEYING SELF: A STUDY IN PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL ROLE 3 (1970).
"The procedures [in philosophy] we are concerned with, then, presuppose a discovery, an
un-covering of the meaningful history of the individual's world." Id. at 5; see also JOHN
SABINI & MAURY SILVER, MORALITIES OF EVERYDAY LIFE (1982) (for a phenomenological
philosophical perspective applied to the moral philosophy of everyday life).
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ordinary use that our concepts of morality and action are
learned and shaped ....
Pitkin makes clear that while this is not the only way to think or
talk about ethics, "it is a powerful and instructive way."3s There
are different routes, different ways to think, talk, and imagine
ethics.3 9
Moral discourse begins when we say what is on our minds,4 °
but it does not end there. Much of what we think is so bound up
with the conventions of the day that our handy opinions, casual
banter, and collegial argument disguise rather than reveal our
ethical stances. If we are to make ethics talk transformative
rather than debilitating, then we must find out how moral
discourse works4' and how we can use it to sharpen and broaden
37. HANNA F. PITKIN, WITTGENSTEIN AND JUSTICE: ON THE SIGNIFICANCE OF LUDWIG
WITTGENSTEIN FOR SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THOUGHT 149 (1972). Steven Tipton applies
Pitkin's observation to those who do not consider themselves philosophers:
To hold moral discourse central to the study of social life is not to imagine
ordinary persons as moral philosophers-writ-small, but rather to recognize that
they, like us, ask themselves "What should I do now? Why?" And that their
answers matter just as much to them as do ours to us.
TIPTON, supra note 26, at xiv.
We must educate ourselves with the moral sensibilities necessary for a public life and
do so by confronting the temptation to mislocate lawyer ethics as the law of lawyering on
the one hand and a matter of personal choice and individual conscience on the other. It
was John Dewey who reminded us that:
Morals is not a catalogue of acts nor a set of rules to be applied like
drugstore prescriptions or cook-book recipes. The need in morals is for specific
methods of inquiry and ofcontrivance: Methods of inquiry to locate difficulties
and evils; methods of contrivance to form plans to be used as working
hypotheses in dealing with them.
DEWEY, supra note 30, at 169-70. We have shamelessly reduced ethics talk in legal
education to a set of rules to be applied like "drugstore prescriptions" and "cook-book
recipes." Id. The problem is not a lack of recipes but that we have forgotten how to cook.
38. PITKIN, supra note 37, at 149.
39. There are many ways to proceed, many ways to think about ethics, many ways to
talk and work together on the moral malaise we find in the legal profession. There is, as
Thomas Nagel recommends for philosophy, an admonition to be aware that "methods are
always themselves in question." NAGEL, supra note 24, at xi.
40. We must first say where we stand, what we think and believe, and what we
propose we will do (when we follow our own dictates).
41. What happens when we engage in debilitating moral discourse? In transformative
moral discourse? Consider the following:
(i) We simply pass the time (idle talk and talk of cynicism);
(ii) We tender our personal opinions to each other (adopting the stance of
relativism);
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the moral sensibilities we have as lawyers. The language and
moral rhetoric that we now routinely accept as uncontroversial
are subject to re-evaluation and re-qualification.
The power and instructive quality of moral discourse lies in
its realness,42 in the way it draws us to consider and re-consider
the moral judgments43 that we make without being aware that
we make them.44 It is our involvement in moral discourse that
leads Hanna Pitkin to claim:
[T]he characteristic setting for moral discourse is one of
dialogue among persons who are actually involved in what has
happened .... No doubt we can contemplate moral principles
in the abstract or hold public discourse about them, but the
center of gravity of moral discourse falls in personal conversa-
tion between an actor and someone affected adversely by what
he did. Moral discourse is personal, though not merely
(iii) We diagnose the known failure of other approaches to lawyer ethics-more
definitive ethical rules, more moral exhortation about professionalism
(preaching);
(iv) We converse to engage in friendship;
(v) We converse to transform character;
(vi) We converse to keep the long-standing conversation on ethical matters alive in
our own time and in our own lives.
42. See Thomas L. Shaffer, The Practice of Law as Moral Discourse, 55 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 231 (1979) (arguing that "[tlhe beginning and end of a lawyer's professional life is
talking with a client about what is to be done"; that this discussion constitutes "moral
conversation"; and that in moral conversation we find ethical orientations that reflect the
moral stances lawyers take with their clients).
Iris Murdoch, in an all too short essay, has referred to a feature of realness she
identifies as a philosophical impulse "against dryness." See Iris Murdoch, Against Dryness:
A Polemical Sketch, in REVISIONS: CHANGING PERSPECTIVES IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY 43
(Stanley Hauerwas & Alasdair MacIntyre eds., 1983); see also HANNAH ARENDT, THE
HUMAN CONDITION: A STUDY OF THE CENTRAL DILEMMAS FACING MODERN MAN 158
(Anchor Books 1959) (1958) ('Action and speech are so closely related because the
primordial and specifically human act must at the same time contain the answer to the
question asked of every newcomer: 'Who are you?' This disclosure of who somebody is, is
implicit in both his words and his deeds.").
43. It is our choice and our ability and our willingness to speak about the character
that brought us to these choices that takes us, sometimes willingly, sometimes resisting,
into the realm of moral discourse.
44. Alfred North Whitehead reminds us that "philosophic truth is to be sought in the
presuppositions of language rather than in its express statements." ALFRED N.
WHITEHEAD, MODES OF THOUGHT vii (Free Press paperback ed. 1968) (1938). Thomas
Nagel points out that [t]he main concern of philosophy is to question and understand very
common ideas that all of us use every day without thinking about them." NAGEL, supra
note 36, at 5.
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subjective or private; it is interpersonal but not really general
or public. Moreover, it arises only where someone is moved to
speak.45
It is conversation between speakers who believe that the outcome
of their contested uses of words and ways of speaking matter that
becomes moral discourse.46
Moral discourse is not values clarification, although there is
much in our values that needs to be explicated and clarified.
What we want from moral discourse is broader than a clarification
of values. What we seek to know is where we stand and how that
affects those who inhabit the world with us. The rhetorical stance
we offer, in contrast to the opinions we are willing to articulate
publicly, defines our character. Ethics talk is too easily mistaken
as a forum for polemic and opinion.
We are free to make whatever claims we want and voice
whatever opinions we will, but our claims and opinions inevitably
give shape to our character. Whenever we hold moral discussions,
Hanna Pitkin notes, "[y]ou can take any position you want, but at
the same time there are standards, and your position defines you
just as surely as your action itself."47 When we speak, we weave
persona and character, surface and depth, into a textured pattern,
a self.48  In speaking we display the surface of character,
45. PITKIN, supra note 37, at 150; see also ARENDT, supra note 42, at 159 ("In acting
and speaking, men [and women] show who they are, reveal actively their unique personal
identities and thus make their appearance in the human world....").
46. For an elaboration of the idea that words can lose moral meaning, see JAMES B.
WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING: CONSTITUTIONS AND RECONSTITUTIONS OF
LANGUAGE, CHARACTER, AND COMMUNITY (1984). On the practical moral significance of
conversation in the physician-patient relationship, see JAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF
DOCTOR AND PATIENT 130-41 (Free Press paperback ed. 1986) (1984) (arguing the
obligation of physicians to converse with their patients).
The value of moral discourse is not beyond question. Paul Goodman points out that
in some traditional settings, speaking "implies intervention, presumptuous assertiveness,
definition, cutting the world down to size, vulgarizing, blasphemy, black magic." PAUL
GOODMAN, SPEAKING AND LANGUAGE: DEFENCE OF POETRY 10-11 (1971).
47. PITKIN, supra note 37, at 154.
48. The way we talk to each other, the way we speak our lives and tell our stories,
reflects how we imagine self and world. If we cannot speak in morally instructive ways,
then human interaction in the world, our human experience of the world, is affected
significantly.
In the image of weaving there is an implication of wholeness. Moral discourse is
related to the idea or fantasy of being a whole person. One philosopher notes that "[t]he
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assuming always that there is substance behind the scenes and
the styles of talk.49
As a matter of fundamental epistemology, "[o]ur understand-
ing of reality is constituted by the language we use to express
it."5° As Steven Tipton has observed, "[u]nderstood in ethical
terms, the ideas we hold give us a model of and for social reality.
They tell us what is so, and what we ought to do about it.""' We
create character when we speak. Stanley Hauerwas argues that
"our moral language does not just describe what is; it describes
how we ought to see and intend the world."52 It is with ethics
talk that we imaginatively connect who we are and what we do.
less integrated and holistic is one's sense of himself, either due to ignorance or out of
ambivalence and a sense of personal fragmentation, the less chance there is of validity in
his judgments." STEPHEN D. Ross, THE NATURE OF MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 118 (1973).
Moral discourse makes demands on a speaker. Moral speech is demanding because
it calls the fragmented self into question, it forces the self to act as if it were whole. Moral
discourse is rich and full because it expresses the ideal ofspeaking as a whole person. The
alternative-that we can never speak as whole persons-implies that we can never get all
our selves back together. For a pluralist, fragmented image of self that argues against the
existence of whole persons as the basis of morality, see XAVIER R. DE VENT6S, SELF-
DEFEATED MAN: PERSONAL IDENTITY AND BEYOND (Christine Denmead trans., Harper
Colophon paperback ed. 1975).
49. William F. May, in a suggestive passage on style, contends:
Style is a much deeper issue than how one packages what one has to say.
Style is a matter of metaphysical perception, a sense for what the Stoics called
the fitting, a discretion that is deeper than tact, more sensitive than rule, a
feeling for what is congruent with reality....
With good reasons moralists have been suspicious of professional guilds
that concentrate on questions of style and decorum. Style meant the
eighteenth-century doctor with his gold-knobbed cane, the journalist with his
note pad, the lawyer with his bulging briefcase, the engineer and the scientist
with their laconic control of hard data. Style can be corrupted to mask
incompetence, to present a false front to the world and cover one's cynical
withdrawal from a client. But, in its uncorrupted state, style is the elegance
of technical competence, a fitness of bearing, and a personal attentiveness to
all dimensions of a case.
William F. May, Professional Ethics: Setting, Terrain, and Teacher, in ETHICS TEACHING
IN HIGHER EDUCATION 205, 218-19 (Daniel Callahan & Sissela Bok eds., 1980).
50. STUART L. CHARMt, MEANING AND MYTH IN THE STUDY OF LIVES: A SARTREAN
PERSPECTIVE 15 (1984).
51. TIPTON, supra note 26, at xiv.
52. STANLEY HAUERWAS, VISION AND VIRTUE: ESSAYS IN CHRISTIAN ETHICAL
REFLECTION 73 (Univ. of Notre Dame Press 1981) (1974); see also Steven M. Tipton, The
Church as a School for Virtue, 117 DAEDALUS 163 (1988) (describing church morality as
"learning and teaching about the whole of social life").
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Moral discourse reflects the value dimension of our lives as
we search for words (and ways) that embody an ideal self and an
image of a socially just world.53 Moral discourse is both an ideal
and a reflection of reality. Sometimes the ideal and reality seem
to be taking us in different directions. The conflict between the
ideals expressed as moral sentiments and the reality of lawyering
lies at the heart of a troubled sense of professional responsibility.
Ethics must help us bridge the ideal, our quest for a better world
using law, and the real, the world we now inhabit as lawyers.
Ethics does not exhort us to become saints and martyrs, nor does
ethics cut us off from the world in which lawyers practice their
craft.
In the use of language to express our understanding of reality
and to shape and define our moral character, we should take more
care with our speaking, listening as we speak, listening as others
speak to us.54 Is it not when we lose the ability to hear our-
selves speak, to see ourselves in our speaking, that we have lost
sight of who we are and what we are becoming? We are, as
Hanna Pitkin noted and Seymour Wishman discovered, strained
and damaged in our action with words and with our ways of
speaking. When lawyers and students of law talk with each other
about Seymour Wishman's humiliation of Mrs. Lewis, they, too,
experience the strain and witness the damage. When we speak
to each other as lawyers, we find that something goes wrong. Our
relations with each other become strained. Something is damaged
53. See DAVID TRACY, PLURALITY AND AMBIGUITY: HERMENEUTICS, RELIGION, HOPE 20
(1987) ("Conversation in its primary form is an exploration of possibilities in the search for
truth."); ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFrER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 2 (2d ed., Univ.
of Notre Dame Press 1984) (1981).
Our capacity to use moral language, to be guided by moral reasoning, to define
our transactions with others in moral terms is so central to our view of
ourselves that even to envisage the possibility of our radical incapacity in these
respects is to ask for a shift in our view of what we are and do which is going
to be difficult to achieve.
Id.
In speech we fashion the reality of our ideals. Talk transformed into authentic
speech signals a movement from the real to the ideal, and from the ideal to the real.
Speech that shows no intention toward movement is loose talk. Speech with transforming
qualities is moral discourse.
54. I do not mean that we should strive to say what others want to hear or make only
those claims to which others will assent. The kind of listening I have in mind acts as an
antidote to conversations in which speakers treat their opinions and ideas as possessions
to be defended. ERICH FROMM, To HAVE OR To BE? 33-34 (1976).
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by the voice of false reasoning.55 It is in moral discourse that we
take notice of blind speech and learn the repair of relations
"strained or damaged by the unforeseen results of some action."'
Moral discourse helps us respond to "action[s] gone wrong.
" 57
Moral discourse is an inquiry into the symptoms of lawyer ethics
talk.
If lawyer ethics talk is to be educative and count as some-
thing worth taking seriously-affecting the way we imagine and
live as lawyers-we are going to need to confront the symptoms
that plague us when we engage each other in moral discourse.
How do we go about disguising our suspicion and disdain for
moral discourse? By what rhetorical and cognitive stances do we
set ourselves against ethics? How does our ethics talk get
stunted?58  If lawyers and students of law are to participate in
this most ancient of conversations, this conversation called ethics,
55. PITKIN, supra note 37, at 154 ("Some ways of elaborating our conduct only make
things worse . . . ."). Legal ethics must free itself from the standard rhetoric of
professionalism. There is little impetus to do that so long as the rhetoric of professional-
ism is taken seriously as a substitute for moral discourse. With a self-justifying
adversarial ethic sacrosanct, as it is today, we will have difficulty imagining that our ethics
as lawyers is as significant as our knowledge of law.
The ideology of professionalism would have us improve and reform present practices,
weed out the bad apples, and clean up our public image. Lawyers associate ethics with
moderate, acceptable, incremental reform. Professional reformists tend not to venture far
afield when they think about ethics. When lawyers embrace ethics, they have in mind a
limited, vulgarized version of ethics, an ethics of regulation to damp the deviant. It is not
the ethics of philosophers and theologians, an ethic of caring, or even an ethic of justice,
but an ethic formed from the normative conventions and practices of lawyers that we
lawyers want to call legal ethics.
Ethics, deformed by the prevailing ideology of conventional professionalism, is so
routinized, secularized, and rule-oriented that it reinforces a narrow, simplified, and
amoral view of professional life. When we make our legal ethics an ethics of rules, we give
over the heart of professionalism to legalism. A legalistic world-view translates the ethics
of professional life into a belief that ethics can be a matter of rule-following.
56. Id. at 149.
57. Id.
58. Consider the following obstacles that might stunt moral discourse: unfulfilled
expectations about ethics, uncertainty about right and wrong, an unwillingness to disclose
moral stances, an education that suggests the futility of moral discourse, a sense of self
that holds talk in disdain, a sense of public space that precludes moral discourse, a distrust
of those who speak about ethics, a belief that talking about ethics doesn't affect behavior
out in the real world, an unwillingness to reflect on the issues raised in moral discourse,
and a fear that ethics will get in the way of success.
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and do so in a meaningful way, we must recognize the obstacles
to what we have set out to do.5 9
When we inquire into our fate as lawyers, how we might live
as lawyers, and the paths we have chosen (or taken without
notice), we confront ourselves and the powerful conflicting voices
of our culture. We must educate ourselves in the language of
these voices and the ethics they represent: the voice that says
that ethics does not matter; the voice that says that if ethics
matters it cannot be a matter of public discourse; the voice that
claims that ethics, including lawyer ethics, is a private matter, a
matter of personal choice and individual conscience; the voice of
caring that admits that ethics matters, but that however much
one may care, others care too little; and the voice that tells us
only fools care.'
It is difficult to talk about these voices and the moral quality
they give our work as lawyers. Talk to lawyers and law students
about ethics (or the lay public, for that matter), and you find
minor differences that reflect deep suspicions about ethics. 1 In
this essay, I take these suspicions about lawyers and their ethics
seriously and examine their appearance in ethics talk as symp-
toms to be observed and addressed with a physician's care. In the
sections that follow, I identify some of the symptoms we find in
59. If we are to engage in moral discourse, whether it be in a legal ethics course in the
law school or elsewhere, we must confront the barriers that impede our efforts. When legal
ethics is approached as ethics, as a conversation about the possibilities and failures of
ethics, about good judgment and the character it takes to have good judgment, there is
going to be resistance. This means that the hopes and fears about the practice of law can
be confronted in a legitimate and authentic way only if we (teachers) recognize that there
are obstacles to moral discourse. In exploring these obstacles, we are actually learning
how to be good lawyers and still retain our self-respect and integrity as human beings. In
the conversation ethics, I propose that we re-introduce ourselves to the questions that we
already carry around with us about our future as lawyers and what it means to be a good
person who is a good lawyer and a successful one.
60. It is hard to talk about ethics with people who don't care. If ethics turns out to be
more a matter of attention and caring (attentive care) than it is following rules, ethical
skepticism is going to interfere with our ability to care. Disdain for ethics is one way we
demonstrate that we have lost the ability to care. See TARTHANG TuLKU, SKILLFUL MEANS
10-14 (1978) (discussing the importance of caring about the work we do).
61. Ethics calls into question assumptions we make about the goodness we attribute
to ourselves by way of our claims to professionalism. The assumption we make about our
own goodness must be examined in light of the contradictions reflected in the deep
suspicions we have about lawyer ethics.
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ethics talk and explore how they act as obstacles to moral
discourse.
IV. THE BAGGAGE WE BRING WITH US; OR,
IT's Too LATE TO LEARN ETHICS
In contracts, torts, administrative law, and constitutional law,
there is an assumption that the study of these subjects will start
at the beginning. What you know about contracts or the
Constitution when you walk into the class doesn't mean a hoot to
the teacher of those subjects. That you know what one colleague
calls the "bar stool law" of torts is not going to be accepted as the
basis for your knowledge of the law of torts as a lawyer. What
you know about contracts when you walk into contracts class may
get you into trouble as much as it will give you a head-start on
learning what the contracts teacher wants you to know. Law
teachers are more or less dogmatic about the notion that what you
bring with you to a law school course is irrelevant. The fantasy
of traditional law teachers is that your pre-existing knowledge
gets in the way when you try to learn law as lawyers need to
know it.
The situation is reversed in moral discourse on lawyer ethics.
We begin ethics talk with the assumption that we already have
whatever ethics we will need as lawyers and that lawyer ethics
can be confined to a study of the special and peculiar ethical roles
and problems of lawyers. So we already have ethics when we
come to study law. Although this assumption about the ethics
we've got and how we are to study lawyer ethics turns out to be
problematic-it can undermine moral discourse-it contains a
kernel of solid truth. We come to the conversation about lawyer
ethics already morally educated. We do not begin a study of
lawyer ethics with a clean slate. We have ideas, notions, con-
cerns, attitudes, values, impulses, fears, and beliefs that provide
direction to the worth and meaning we attribute to our profession-
al lives.
62. This assumption can, and should, be deconstructed. It can be examined alongside
the equally problematic assumption that the topic of ethics does not, and cannot, have
clear-cut beginnings and endings that students oflaw expect of legal subjects. Without the
boundaries of beginning and ending, ethics breaks down, and our roles as students,
teachers, and lawyers are called into question.
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Legal education is far too late in the scheme of things to be
teaching and learning ethics,63 at least this is the common
refrain. The cows are already out of the barn. We are who we
are. There is not much incentive to think and talk ethics if you
assume that you are already ethical, that you are as ethical now
as you are ever going to be. James Pike found "that virtually
every lawyer wants to feel that he is not only a good lawyer (in
the sense of technical proficiency) but that he is a lawyer of
impeccable'integrity. He not only wishes this to be his public
image; he wishes to think this of himself.' 4 This "I've already
got my ethics" assumption is analogous to what Karl Jaspers
found in philosophy: "In philosophical matters almost everyone
believes himself capable of judgment.... Our own humanity, our
own destiny, our own experience strike us as a sufficient basis for
philosophical opinions.""5 Perhaps it is this notion, that we are
already as ethical and philosophical as we need to be, that sets
the conversation ethics apart from legal discourse. When we
63. It is too late, not just because we have reached the end of the line in terms of
formal education or reached the beginning of the line in terms of professional work, but
because of a sense that all moral discourse has fallen into disarray:
Granted that there are many moral languages in use around us, each with its
own assumptions about reality and complicit in a distinct way of life, and
granted that our condition is often one of discord and misunderstanding, do we
have good reason to regret coming on the scene belatedly--after an age of
coherent discourse and community?
STOUT, supra note 21, at 2; see also MACINTYRE, supra note 53, at 1 (beginning his
argument for a virtue-oriented ethics with a parable about the condition of modern-day
moral discourse in which the world as we once knew it has been lost).
Skeptics, relativists, modernists, and the weak of heart, each with a different rhetoric,
assume that it is too late to engage in moral discourse. The relativist may concede that
ethics matters but concludes that it matters to each of us in an idiosyncratic fashion.
There is no means or mechanism, the relativist tells us, to determine what is good in any
collective sense. In matters of morals and ethics everything must be determined on an ad
hoc basis. The possibilities of moral conversation with relativists are limited. Modernists,
too, have forsaken ethics talk as an impossible quest for truth, a truth for which there can
be no foundation. But see Drucilla Cornell, Toward a Modern /Postmodern Reconstruction
of Ethics, 133 U. PA. L. REV 291 (1985); Drucilla Cornell, "Convention" and Critique, 7
CARDOzO L. REV. 679 (1986) (providing a rare modernist account of contemporary ethics
in legal scholarship). The weak of heart, well, they always find reason to pass when it
comes to ethics talk. "It is often said that the hottest places in Hell are reserved for those
who in times of moral crisis remain neutral." Anthony E. Cook, Beyond Critical Legal
Studies: The Reconstructive Theology of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., 103 HARv. L. REV.
985, 1044 (1990).
64. JAMES A. PIKE, BEYOND THE LAW: THE RELIGIOUS AND ETHICAL MEANING OF THE
LAWYER'S VOCATION 91 (1963).
65. KARL JASPERS, WAY TO WISDOM: AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 8-9 (Ralph
Manheim trans., Yale Univ. Press 1954) (1951).
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participate in legal discourse, we assume we have something to
learn.
There is enough truth in the "virtue can't be taught" argu-
ment,6 as in most scraps of conventional wisdom, to make it a
tenacious platitude. Platitudes, like the old refrain about the
inability of old dogs to learn new tricks and the admonition that
"it is too late" to learn ethics, dramatically de-moralize ethics talk.
To ignore the plea that "it is too late to learn ethics" would
require us to overlook an active obstacle to moral discourse. To
ignore the plea is to ignore what happens when we try to talk
about our moral lives, our values and ideals, and the conflict we
experience as we seek insight into the moral sensibilities neces-
sary for a professional life.
There is no sin in being realistic about the difficulties of
moral education. But the notion that "it is too late" to teach
ethics may turn out to be more skepticism than realism. The
skeptic, with her ambivalence about ethics, must underplay the
influence of moral matters, and in doing so miscalculates the
effects of moral discourse.67
66. See PLATO, PROTAGORAS, supra note 2 (on Socrates' skepticism about the possibility
of teaching virtue); GILBERT C. MEILAENDER, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF VIRTUE 45-74
(1984). The irony of Socrates' teaching is that he continues to act and to live as if virtue
could be comprehended and taught in the dialectic of dialogical conversation. Socrates
reminds us, in every conversation he conducts, that the first and last question of
philosophy is how one should live a virtuous life. See BERNARD WILLIAMS, ETHICS AND THE
LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY 1-21 (1985). But cf Eisele, supra, note 25 (for a contemporary
response to Socrates and the questions he raises about the teaching of virtue).
67. Skepticism is a low-level form of psychic numbing. It is skepticism and psychic
numbing that make it possible to talk the way law students and lawyers do. Ethics talk,
however, can be used to fight psychic numbing:
We must dream of a better world from within the confines of what has been
given to us in language, and in the stories and fables of the past. However,
stories as patchworks can always be re-assembled. Memory is creative,
precisely because she bears within herself the promise of the future.
Drucilla Cornell, Beyond Tragedy and Complacency, 8 Nw. U. L. REV. 693, 715 (1987).
We need to identify the intricate ways in which skepticism cuts us off from meaning
on the one hand, and helps us maintain a critical view of ourselves and our world on the
other. Skepticism is a double-edged sword.
Skepticism leads to the conclusion that there is nothing to be done about those who
take moral shortcuts. It really is, the skeptic tells us, a dog-eat-dog world and to survive
you must fight fire with fire. Only the strong survive. The rich get richer and the rest get
what the rich don't take (in a trickle-down theory of moral economy). To be concerned
about ethics in the legal profession, in government, or in business means only that you are
a fool. For skeptics, ethics cannot be allowed to matter; it is as simple and profound as
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If, as so many believe, it is too late in law school for adult
students to learn ethics, then the first stage of moral discourse is
to learn something about the ethics that we already have. It is
one thing to say, "It is too late to learn ethics," but another to say,
"I don't want to talk about the ethics I've already got."6 In
ethics talk, we re-learn what we assume we already know. 9 The
way we think and talk ethics points to the lives we live, the lives
we see others living, and the lives we imagine it possible to live.
When we turn away from the voice of ongoing moral concerns, we
let the symptoms of ethics talk go untreated.
The ethics we already have, and the assumptions we derive
from ethics already in place, become problematic and symptomatic
when we realize that most of us, most of the time, are on ethical
"automatic pilot." We don't think or worry about ethics. We let
whatever ethics that is "built-in," the ethics we got growing up, be
our ethics.7° We live our morals and ethics without thinking
about them. The problem with thinking about ethics is, as
Hannah Arendt observes, that it "rouses you from sleep."71 We
think we know what to do, how to live, and who to be. We think,
at times, especially those times when we are asked to talk ethics,
that we know who we are. Knowing who we are, we know what
to do. As one student explained, "The reason we don't see an
ethical problem in so many of the situations we talk about is that
we have already made up our minds." We assume away the
ethical nature of the problems that come our way. 2 In fact, we
that.
68. This discussion assumes that one claims.already to be an ethical person. I take
no account here of the "amoralist" who makes no such claim. See BERNARD WILLIAMS,
MORALITY: AN INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS 1-12 (1972).
69. If our ethics isn't constantly being learned, how do we attain wisdom? Wisdom is
the province of those who weave their ethics out of experience and evaluation, judgment
and character, knowledge and mystery, pain and perplexity.
70. We do not, in this view, play a conscious, active role in setting the shape of our
own ethics. We are simply what we have grown to be.
71. HANNAH ARENDT, THINKING 178 (1978).
72. Whenever we encounter resistance to the idea that a "legal problem" has an ethical
dimension we may find that: (i) we can't recognize ethical dilemmas or don't know what
we mean when we say that a problem poses an ethical dilemma; (ii) we don't want to
recognize ethical dilemmas because they make life more complicated and more difficult;
and (iii) we are sufficiently socialized into the professional "hired gun" role that we believe
that whatever lawyers do, in fact, constitutes ethical behavior.
One problem with recognizing the moral features of our professional practices is the
way we randomly shift the focus of attention in such a way that we are often unclear about
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further assume that ethical problems are undesirable. We want
a trouble-free, symptom-less life, a life that runs like a Toyota
that never needs maintenance. We end up walking through life
not seeing and not knowing that we are immersed in ethics. Our
ethical problems are painful reminders of what we work so hard
to forget.
In the conversation ethics, we are confronted with an ethics
already in place, an ethics flowing from the past; we locate
ourselves with a repertoire of rhetorical moves that silence moral
doubts and concerns. Obviously, this silencing doesn't work, wish
as we may that it did. If it worked, we would not be plagued with
lawyer jokes and TV soap opera dramas that so prominently
feature lawyers and their moral dilemmas. Paradoxically, it is
this ethics we already have in place, secure or disjointed as the
ethics may be, that provides a reservoir of impulses, sentiments,
memories, and beliefs that constitutes our moral character, a
character that it would take a massive effort at indoctrination
(brainwashing is the more vivid term) to redirect. The ethics, and
associated baggage, ethical and otherwise, we bring to the
conversation ethics is valuable and yet problematic in our efforts
to understand how ethics works.73 Learning to value the morals
you bring with you to the law is the point of ethics talk. Be
forewarned, however, that what we bring with us can be the
where we stand. One obstacle to moral discourse is the dubious distinction between morals
as a kind of subjective valuing and ethics as socially derived objective standards of value.
It is common to hear students of lawyer ethics distinguish between the morals of individual
conscience and the ethics of professional duties. They believe morals to be aspirational
while ethics establish minimal prescribed duties. They are more willing to talk about rule-
based duties than about moral aspirations.
In the approach to the study of lawyer ethics emphasized in this essay, conversation
mediates what Bernard Williams calls the "inside" and the "outside" stance toward ethics.
WILLIAMS, supra note 66, at 30-53. The "inside" point of view relates to the excellence of
character we associate with virtue. Virtues are, in Williams' explanation, "internalized
dispositions of action, desire, and feeling." Id. at 35-36. The "outside" point of view takes
account of our civic self with its concerns for "[o]ther people's welfare" and the "require-
ments of justice" (among other things of value). Id. at 51.
73. The need to see ourselves as "good people" is sufficiently compelling that we create
powerful illusions to promote our positive self-images. We tell ourselves that we are doing
the right thing, making the right choices, and moving in the right direction. We seek
affirmation that what we say to others about ourselves is true. The view that we have of
ourselves as "good" (regardless of the truthfulness of the notion) is a powerful determinant
in how we live. See SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, POSITIVE ILLUSIONS: CREATIVE SELF-DECEPTION
AND THE HEALTHY MIND (1989) (a psychological account of the illusions we use in everyday
life).
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source of self-deception. 4 Law school and lawyering perform a
dual alchemy, gold into lead, and lead into gold. 5
The purpose of lawyer ethics talk is not to promote a cult of
moral elitists, but to provide clarity on the kind of expectations
and assumptions, and identifications and sensibilities that find
their way into the rhetoric of our moral stances and how this
rhetoric and fervent talk impoverish our character as lawyers.
What I seek in ethical conversation is an inquiry into lawyer
ethics that focuses on the rhetoric stances 76 that we take in the
name of ethics: rhetorical stances that empower us, and rhetori-
cal stances that marginalize the ideals associated with law.
The conversation ethics calls forth the character we already
have, the character we bring with us to legal education and the
practice of law. The problem (otherwise we should have no need
for an explicit course of conversation in lawyer ethics) is that
some of our ideas are the basis for a moral life in the practice of
law, others are the basis for hypocrisy and self-deception. It is
possible to deceive ourselves about the kind of persons we are and
about the kind of persons that we must be to do what lawyers do.
We make assumptions about ourselves and about lawyers, and
many of them turn out to be ill-founded. Seymour Wishman's
Confessions is a vivid example.77
When we look at how our assumptions about ethics work,
that is, our ethics baggage, we begin to see self-deception as a
symptom of more deep-seated problems. Ethics talk reminds us
that we may need to change our minds about who we want to be
74. See MIKE W. MARTIN, SELF-DECEPTION AND MORALITY (1986) (philosophical
accounts of self-deception); STEPHEN D. Ross, MORAL DECISION: AN INTRODUCTION TO
ETHICS 285-89 (1972). The most accessible account of self-deception that I have found for
pedagogical use is Stanley Hauerwas' essay on Albert Speer, the Nazi war criminal. See
HAUERWAS, supra note 35, at 82-98.
75. Our understanding of ethics and moral discourse may turn, on examination, to be
no better than our understanding of alchemy. We tend to be righteously dismissive about
alchemy as bad chemistry. We know little to nothing of the true quest of the alchemists
to transform themselves as they worked to transform the materia of their outer world.
76. These rhetorical stances are what Robert Nozick identifies as "stances toward
value" or "lifestances." See ROBERT NOZICK, THE EXAMINED LIFE: PHILOSOPHICAL
MEDITATIONS 151-61 (Touchstone ed. 1990) (1989) (commenting on egoistic, relational, and
absolute stances toward value).
77. WISHMAN, supra note 27.
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and how we want to think about ourselves as lawyers.7" It
pushes us to take fuller account of the assumptions that we hold
uncritically and unreflectively. In ethics talk, there is the
possibility of re-working and re-educating the assumptions that
we use to construct a morally constricted universe that make it
possible to do harm and speak of the harm as a necessary,
inevitable, and functional part of a role that we cannot help but
enact.
Moral discourse, when it works, and it does not always
work,79 helps us see what kind of ethics we already have, and
how we embody our ethics in a story that justifies and makes
coherent the character we bring to the choices we make when we
practice law. We need to know what kind of ethic we adopt when
we train our minds for legal discourse. 0 We need to know how
our moral sensibilities get muted, dulled, stunted, and compro-
mised.
We each have moral baggage that we carry around with us
and carry into ethics talk, although it is true that some travel
lighter than others. One of the reasons we fear ethics talk (and
disguise ethics talk the way we do) is the fear that the baggage
we carry with us is inadequate and may not be so praiseworthy
as we assume. There are symptoms of moral disorder in our
78. How should we work and talk together to try to change each other's minds about
the things that matter to us? When should we change our minds? What kind of discourse
will make needed changes of mind possible? How are we to think carefully and to think
straight about this matter of changing our own minds, and talking with others about
matters in which we can only hope they will see it possible to change theirs?
79. What is frequently assumed to be the futility and failure of moral discourse is
associated with the problem of never being able to get to the beginning of ethics. We
know, intuitively, that we don't get our ethics in law school. This means that law school
ethics talk is like walking in on a movie that has already started. You take caution to
leave the house at the right time so that you get downtown for the 7 p.m. movie and then
find that you have arrived late. There is, for most of us, something annoying about getting
to a movie late. In the case of ethics there is something annoying about a conversation
that assumes so much, that takes us not to a beginning or end, but plops us in the middle.
There is, I am afraid, simply no way to initiate a conversation about ethics that starts at
the beginning; we are always getting to ethics late.
80. Legal discourse provides a new web of meaning, personal and cultural, that acts
as an overlay on the map of ordinary reality, common-sense, and moral sensibility. As
lawyers, we view the world in a way that both narrows our vision and makes it possible
to speak in an authoritative voice. The risk is that we come to believe that our legal
language, and the voice in which it presents itself, reflects a truthful view of the world.
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ethics talk, symptoms that infect the moral sensibilities we import
into our lives as lawyers.
In moral discourse, when it works, we begin to recover a
sense of an existing self, a sense of the person we desire to be,
and an image of ourselves as lawyers that includes our moral
sensibilities. We find again and anew how the moral implications
of our legal and professional character are prefigured in the ways
we have already learned to imagine and talk about our lives as
lawyers. With moral discourse we see how our rationalizations
and justifications, aspirations and moral ideals, give character to
our work as lawyers.
V. LETTING OUR ETHICS Go UNDERGROUND; OR,
GETTING ABSORBED AS INSIDERS
When it comes to ethics, we can put ourselves on "automatic
pilot" and ignore ethics talk. Living this way lets ethics fade into
context like a quiet person at a noisy party. Ethics is subtextual;
it quietly influences and informs what we do and say, the
characters we adopt, the scripts we enact in the personal dramas
of day-to-day life. We are prompted by this subtext without
necessarily being aware of it: we exist in a moral story, uncon-
scious of how our lives are guided, shaped and molded, and pulled
and pushed by the influence of the story we are in. As we are in
stories, we are also in one myth or another, or moving from one
myth to another. Our ethics is part of the myth we are already
living.8' Because we are characters in the story we live (but not
always, as it turns out, the principal characters), we forget how
we live, and how our own ethics work. 2
With the warm blanket of professionalism, we quiet plaguing
doubts about our ethics as lawyers. We become so enamored with
and embedded in the felt logic and perceived necessity of the
81. See MICHAEL NovAK, THE EXPERIENCE OF NOTHINGNESS 23-29 (Harper Torchbook
1978) (1971) (providing a brief account of the shift from an ethics that "concentrate[s] upon
logic and language" to one that concentrates upon "the drive to understand and upon
myths and symbols").
82. When we are unconscious of how ethics is played out in our personal and collective
myths, we give over the world to those who imagine that they can speak for us.
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adversarial ethic that an ideal is converted into pathology.s3 The
legal mind-set drives ethics underground because ethics talk
alerts us to the limits of an adversarial ethic and calls the
games 4 we play as lawyers into question.8 5  We want to be
good lawyers and we want to play the game well. We become
insiders and participate in an adversarial ethos. When the
rhetoric of ethics and professionalism would have us express our
doubts and make moral distinctions, our position as insiders
allows us to push these considerations aside.
Taking on the ethos of lawyering and adopting an ethic of
adversarialism is not in and of itself a bad thing. Being an
insider gives us access to the power of skills, what Stanley
Hauerwas and Thomas Shaffer describe in the life of Sir Thomas
More as "hope as skill."86 The lawyer's adversarial ethic can
form the basis for authentic pride,"' or support an ethic embod-
ied in a voice and a persona that makes possible the lawyer
stereotypes of L.A. Law.""8 Our adversarial ethic is a reality-a
83. See James R. Elkins, The Legal Persona: An Essay on the Professional Mask, 64
VA. L. REV. 735 (1978).
84. One example of an image of lawyer work that has moral consequences is the notion
that the practice of law is a game. Thinking of what we do as a "game" may allow us to
distance ourselves from the morally queasy practices that we both abhor and seem all too
willing to use. Games are bound by rules and lawyers work with rules every day.
Lawyers know how to understand and manipulate rules. Rules define the basic moves of
any game and are used as reference points to resolve conflict over contested moves. The
outer limits of legitimate play are also determined by explicit or "hard" rules. There is,
however, an ethic of the game, a sensibility about how a quality game is played, that is
always, of necessity, beyond the rules. See ROBERT S. DE ROPP, THE MASTER GAME:
PATHWAYS TO HIGHER CONSCIOUSNESS BEYOND THE DRUG EXPERIENCE (New Delta ed.
1989); HERMANN HESSE, MAGISTER LUDI (Mervyn Savill trans., Frederick Ungar 1949)
(1943); JAMES P. CARSE, FINITE AND INFINITE GAMES (Ballantine ed. 1987) (1986); MICHAEL
MACCOBY, THE GAMESMAN: THE NEW CORPORATE LEADERS (Bantam ed. 1978) (1976)
(providing accounts of the game metaphor that do not turn on a set of rules of play).
85. What would prompt anyone to examine his or her work as a lawyer through a
moral lens if it were possible to get by and get along without doing so? If we are not
experienced or educated (or even asked) to make the moral dimension of our thinking
explicit, and if we have been adjudged successful even as we resist moral discourse, then
how can moral discourse ever find a place, much less a secure footing, in our lives?
86. Stanley Hauerwas & Thomas L. Shaffer, Hope in the Life of Thomas More, 54
NOTRE DAME LAW. 569, 573, 575 (1979).
87. See, e.g., DAVID MELLINKOFF, THE CONSCIENCE OF A LAWYER (1973).
88. I do not mean to suggest that L.A. Law is without pedagogical value for the moral
lessons it embodies, albeit in Hollywood fashion, in the drama of the lawyers' lives it
portrays. See Stephen Gillers, Taking L.A. Law More Seriously, 98 YALE L.J. 1607 (1989);
Robert E. Rosen, Ethical Soap: L.A. Law and the Privileging of Character, 43 U. MIAMI L.
386 [Vol. 17:353
1993] Difficulties of Talking Ethics 387
realism that gets us into trouble. Michael Novak has observed
that "[r]ealism effectively makes one a participant in the ongoing
system. It stifles the revolutionary, utopian, visionary impulse.
It teaches one compromise, patience, and acquiescence. ""
Imagine the confusion for law students moving in the liminal
space from legal outsiders to insiders-in transition, betwixt and
between, neither here nor there, in twilight. Ethics talk takes us
into liminality because moral discourse reverses roles.9° Tradi-
tionally, the insider-teacher initiates the outsider-student. The
uninitiated student (outsider) stands before the law9 ' and seeks
admission to law's mysteries and powers. The law teacher stands
watch as gatekeeper to the inner sanctum and guardian protector
of the deep mysteries of law.92
In law school ethics talk, this tradition of roles is reversed.
The teacher of moral discourse remains a gatekeeper, but one who
seeks to demystify and deconstruct adversarialism while caution-
ing moderation in the pursuit of the secret pleasures of legal
REV. 1229 (1989) (explaining the pedagogical value of L.A Law).
89. NOVAK, supra note 81, at 22. We talk about reality in the everyday language of
Necessity. Necessity is everywhere. The felt sense of Necessity with all its routines
constitutes the ore from which we extract the central motifs of our storied lives. Our
storied lives are revealed as moral enactments and made visible in Necessity, in what we
are ever assuming must be said and done. There is too little time, too much to do, too
much to know, too many skills to learn and improve, and too many techniques to master,
we tell ourselves, to be chasing after an always elusive ethics, even the ethics embedded
in our own stories.
The Necessity of everyday life and the Reality of lawyering pervade our choices,
sometimes usurping and dominating other perspectives and other realities. The prosaic
and mundane, ever present, in lawyering and in life, become a thick, crusty, impenetrable
shield that cuts us off from moral sensibilities.
90. In the moral discourse of outsiders and insiders, we vacillate between gaining
ground (understanding) and losing it (despair). In liminal space/time there is no sense of
progress, and we experience dismay and suffering. In the liminality of role reversal, the
student of ethics complains that ethical talk is an obstacle to becoming an acknowledged
insider.
91. Students of law have made their way to the threshold and are beginning to see
what law is and how it works and how it is practiced by lawyers. It is against this reality
that ethics must find a place.
92. See FRANZ KAFKA, Before the Law, in THE PENAL COLONY: STORIES AND SHORT
PIECES 148-50 (Willa and Edwin Muir trans., Schocken Paperback 1961) (1948) (providing
an accounting of standing outside and before the law that induces an awareness of mystery
and tragedy).
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zealousness.93 The student, her ethics assured, "we all already
have our ethics," adopts the posture of an insider, ethics already
in place, eager to embrace the adversarial ethic, ready to accept
a narrowly defined professional role; adopts a legal persona;94
and speaks in the disembodied voice of the law.95
With their eyes set firmly on the prize, students see moral
discourse as a threat to a fragile, hard-won, insider status and the
security of a professional identity. The hostility to moral dis-
course is that of an insider who has taken up residence in a new
moral fortress. Ethics talk raises the fear of outsiders attacking,
stealing, and dishonoring the hard-won gains of newly initiated
93. The teaching space of moral discourse is liminal for the law teacher because ethics
confronts law, reintroduces the legal persona to its shadow, and deconstructs legal
discourse. When lawyer ethics is translated as the law of lawyering, liminality is avoided.
94. See Elkins, supra note 83.
95. Mark Yudof observes that:
A major purpose of legal education-and certainly the primary task of law and
lawyers operating within the framework of a legal system-is to recognize
some order in the disparate human voices in any legal controversy. That
recognition is necessary if disputes are to be settled in accordance with
principles that transcend individual cases. It enables society to treat people
equally, to treat like cases alike, and to avoid rampant favoritism-in short,
to achieVe formal justice.
Mark G. Yudof, "Tea at the Palaz of Hoon". The Human Voice in Legal Rules, 66 TEX. L.
REv. 589, 590 (1988).
Although "human voice," in Yudofs view, may be critical to the "dynamic of
justification" of the legal system, it must remain an external rather than internal critique
of law. Id. at 591. Human voice "does not suggest an internal critique that would permit
individualized exceptions to static legal rules." Id. Why is Yudof worried about an
"internal" critique? "By challenging the efficacy of all general statements of legal norms,
the internal critique is tantamount to an attack on the legitimacy of the enterprise of law
itself-it denies the viability of law as a context for knowing." Id. The bottom line for
Yudof is that "human voice," if allowed to compete fully with "professional voice" would
undermine "the very idea of formal justice for all.' Id. at 591, 595. Yudof draws a rather
nebulous and worrisome distinction between formal justice and substantive justice.
Human voice may, argues Yudof:
[Liure us away from formal justice, equal treatment of persons, and legal
principles that transcend individual cases. Use of the human voice in this way
would, I believe, favor a form of substantive rationality, justice without
principles or rules, justice in response to the life stories of each individual. In
such a world, the processes of law would be illegitimate, for "doing" law would
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insiders.96 Moral discourse is symptomatic of a topsy-turvy
world where an ethic can be overvalued, vices claimed as virtues,
and outsiders who talk ethics can be kept in their place. Ethics
talk makes painfully obvious what successful insiders do in the
name of professionalism.97 The slavish devotion to the adver-
sarial ethic gives rise to strong talk in quest of moral justification.
We resent ethics talk because ethics pathologizes and indicts the
world in which we live, implicating us in the pathologies of the
law-world ethos.
VI. KEEPING ETHICS IN ITS PLACE; OR,
NOT HERE, NOT Now
It is a legacy of modern education and a feature of contempo-
rary culture that morals and ethics have a limited place in public
discourse. 9 We simply do not see or think or talk about the
96. Our status, prestige, and autonomy as professionals promote and sustain the
disdain of outsider criticism. We shield ourselves from the truth. Although it may not be
possible to rid oneself of all self-deception, which itself will justify many from making the
effort, it is possible to be more aware of the operative ethics in the paths we follow. The
way we do our work, the way we are in the world with others, the way we are in relation
with all else is reflected in the ethic and ethics of professionalism, and in turn reflected in
ethics talk.
97. See LEO TOLSTOY, The Death of Ivan Ilych, in GREAT SHORT WORKS OF LEO
TOLSTOY 245-302 (Louise Maude & Aylmer Maude trans., Perennial Library 1967) (1886).
The law-trained Ivan Ilych was not, according to Tolstoy, a "toady," but "by nature
attracted to people of high station as a fly is drawn to the light, assimilating their ways
and views of life and establishing friendly relations with them." Id. at 256. We have each
learned (have we not?), as did Ivan Ilych, to do:
[T]hings which had formerly seemed to him very horrid and made him feel
disgusted with himself when he did them; but when later on he saw that such
actions were done by people of good position and that they did not regard them
as wrong, he was able not exactly to regard them as right, but to forget about
them entirely or not be at all troubled at remembering them.
Id. Ronald Sampson says of Ilych that he had the capacity "for comfortable adjustment
and elasticity of conscience, with antennae so delicately and quickly attuned to sensing the
currents of dominant opinion" and, therefore, "was admirably equipped to rise in the world
and advance his career." RONALD V. SAMPSON, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF POWER 127 (Vintage
Books 1968) (1966).
98. Ethics speaks to the ways we choose to be in the world with others and,
consequently, cannot be divorced from politics and social ideology. That ethics cannot be
divorced from politics and society does not mean that we have not tried. In contrast to a
mindset that consciously works to limit the place of ethics, ethics as critical moral inquiry
offers an opening into the social, political, and culturally induced features of our ethics.
See STOUT, supra note 21, at 161 (providing a succinct statement of the philosophical
history of efforts to limit moral discourse). My previous efforts to escape the bounds of law
school versions of moral discourse are described in James R. Elkins, A Conversation Called
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bulk of what we do as lawyers and students of law with the
understanding that we are knee-deep in ethics every step of the
way. When you ask lawyers or law students whether the decision
to represent a particular client, whose interest and proposed
course of action will result in significant harm to other persons or
to a community or to their own character, constitutes a moral
problem, they are as likely to say that it does not as that it
does.99 When you ask law students whether the humiliation of
a truth-telling witness during cross-examination is a moral or
ethical problem, they are likely to say it is not. We continue to
chase the fantasy expressed by Oliver Wendell Holmes when he
mused:
For my own part, I often doubt whether it would not be a gain
if every word of moral significance could be banished from the
law altogether, and other words adopted which should convey
legal ideas uncolored by anything outside the law.... [B]ut by
ridding ourselves of an unnecessary confusion we should gain
very much in the clearness of our thought.1"
Ethics, 10 LEGAL STUD. F. 265 (1986); James R. Elkins, The Pedagogy of Ethics, 10 J.
LEGAL PROF. 37 (1985) [hereinafter Elkins, The Pedagogy of Ethics]; James R. Elkins, The
Examined Life: A Mind in Search of Heart, 30 AM. J. JURIS. 155 (1985); James R. Elkins,
Ethics: Professionalism, Craft, and Failure, 73 KY. L.J. 937 (1984-85) [hereinafter Elkins,
Professionalism, Craft, and Failure]; and James R. Elkins, Moral Discourse and Legalism
in Legal Education, 32 J. LEGAL EDUC. 11 (1982).
A review of writings on the pedagogy of lawyer ethics will disappoint those in search
of a method to teach law students what they will need as moral actors in the practice of
law. The reason is hinted at by Paul Tillich's description of the Existential thinker:
The Existential thinker cannot have pupils in the ordinary sense. He
cannot communicate any ideas, because they are not the truth he wants to
teach. He can only create in his pupil by indirect communication that
"Existential state" or personal experience out of which the pupil may think and
act.
PAUL TILLICH, THEOLOGY OF CULTURE 90 (Robert C. Kimball ed., 1959).
99. We keep ethics off center-stage, hidden, and out of awareness so that we can give
free play to adversarial ethics. We want ethics to be implicit, offstage, and the background
scenery for enactment of a prosperous life.
100. Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 464 (1898).
The study of ethics continues to play a marginal role in both legal education and the
continuing education of practicing lawyers. When we relegate legal ethics to the periphery
of legal education, we can expect ethical concerns to be of peripheral concern in the
practice of law. If ethics is to matter in the lives of lawyers (and their clients), moral
discourse must be made central rather than peripheral to the education and training of
lawyers. Ethics will be peripheral in the education and practice of lawyers, until we learn
to talk about ethics in a serious way-in a way that makes our ethical bearing central to
our everyday lives as lawyers.
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And how does this attitude about keeping moral discourse in
its place work? Consider the following vignette from a law faculty
lounge: A small group of law teachers sits around a large oval
table. The conversation turns to teaching effectiveness and the
pedagogical innovations that motivate students to learn. As the
conversation progresses, the talk drifts into a discussion of
competence in classroom teaching. The colleagues agree that one
of their number (not present at the table) is incompetent. At this
point, Roger remarks, "We may agree that Paul is incompetent,
but the real problem is that we refuse to do anything about it.
Students complain. We complain. But nothing happens. I don't
think we are ethical, as teachers, when we sit by and do nothing.
We would be outraged if our colleagues at the medical school
followed our example. We let Paul continue teaching. Students
certainly don't feel like they are in a position to do anything. We
turn our backs on the problem and nothing is done. It is a
disgrace that we let this happen."
Some years ago, I undertook a study of legal ethics teaching and had an opportunity
to talk with law school ethics teachers and to observe their classes. When they weren't
searching in the Code of Professional Responsibility for answers to ethical problems, they
tended, as Thomas Shaffer has noted, "to equate one's morals with one's taste in beer."
THOMAS L. SHAFFER, AMERICAN LEGAL ETHICS: TEXT, READINGS, AND DISCUSSION ToPics
xxviii (1985). They indeed made "a fetish of tolerance" while trying to promote discussion
and avoid the dilemma of suggesting to students that they, the teachers, might have a
sense of right and wrong. Id. When moral arguments arose, both the arguments and the
students making them tended to remain unchallenged and unanalyzed. As Shaffer puts
it: "We do not evaluate the moral arguments we make to one another." Id. Both teacher
and student seem manifestly uncomfortable trying to articulate their ethical stances, and
unwilling to discuss the obstacles they confronted in making an effort to do so.
Consequently, the legal ethics class I observed sounded soft, ephemeral, and lacked
intellectual rigor.
Many of us share Shaffer's sentiments about our legal ethics courses, knowing at
some level, that more is possible, that although the teaching of ethics, the talking about
ethics, is difficult, it is not beyond our means to make legal ethics an interesting, even
commanding subject.
The study of legal ethics is not simply an effort to teach law students moral
philosophy and ethical theory-an approach that characterizes the early efforts to teach
medical ethics as ethics. We can imagine legal ethics as ethics and still avoid the
temptation to make legal ethics the study of moral philosophy applied to problems of the
legal profession. Ethics can be derived not only from philosophy, but from a study of
literature, psychology, sociology, history, and theology. The problem is that legal ethics
is packaged and presented to students as a study of the rules that constrain the practice
of law. If the aim of ethics is to locate and examine the roots of moral sensibility in the
practice of a professional craft, then ethics must reach out to disciplines and perspectives
that suggest ways of seeing and experiencing the world that help a professional know what
to do, and more importantly, know how to live. As Thomas Shaffer put it, "we will do well
not to let it [the course in legal ethics] get narrow on us." Id. at xxiii.
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Fred, another colleague, joins the conversation, "Roger, I
agree with you about Paul's competence, but don't you think
calling us unethical goes a little too far? You are going to have to
define what you mean by unethical."
Roger responds, "I am puzzled by your reaction. I'm not
single-handedly making a personal assessment of Paul's teaching.
We agree that he's incompetent. We don't need a definition of
ethics to talk about a colleague's incompetence. Talking about
how we should define ethics is a ploy to avoid talking about our
complicity in Paul's incompetence. That we do nothing says
something about us, about our ethics as teachers. It's really that
simple."
"Well, it's difficult to talk about a colleague's competence,"
Fred replies, "but more difficult still when you put it as a matter
of ethics."
Roger is willing to make a minor concession, but persists in
pressing his colleagues to see the moral dimension of the situa-
tion, "Fred, sadly enough, you are right. Talking about ethics
doesn't seem to get us anywhere, but talking about Paul's
incompetence and our complicity in ethical terms does force us to
take account of what we are doing, to defend ourselves. Talking
about ethics is a way of being honest. We preach professional
responsibility to our students--demand it of them-and then deny
responsibility when it comes to ourselves. We are simply
hypocrites."
Fred replies, "Roger, this moralistic stance of yours makes me
uncomfortable. We all have different views about teaching and
what it means to be competent in the classroom. I don't see how
Paul's teaching is a matter of ethics. You say it is unethical for
us to do nothing. I don't see it that way. There is no way to
resolve a difference when presented as a matter of ethics. You
undoubtedly have a view of ethics that is different from
mine.- '0 '
101. We confront here a working, practical, philosophy that holds it to be unhelpful,
and perhaps even wrong, to view our everyday concerns and conflicts through a moral
prism. The problem is not that we do not identify and accept a particular moral/ethical
conclusion that is an obstacle to moral discourse, but that we make, in our conversations
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Phillip, another colleague, agreeing with Fred, says, "I think
Fred is right, there are as many views of ethics as there are
people at this table. You're not going to get agreement about
anything if you talk about ethics. Talking about competence as
an ethical matter confuses the issue." °2
Roger, Fred, and Phillip leave the lounge to teach their
morning classes where the symptoms of moral discourse will, as
in this conversation, go unrecognized.
and in our lives, a serious, sustained effort to push moral discourse to the periphery of
consciousness and translate moral sensibilities with a crude language of instrumentalism.
See CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF THE MODERN IDENTITY 499-
502 (1989) (providing a chilling description of instrumentalism). It is not the one path that
we seek in moral discourse, but how being on the path we follow makes a particular life
possible, and how it might impoverish the life we seek to live. We attempt to inhabit a
world with others and yet follow different paths with different conceptions of the good. We
value diversity and tolerance. But not every path, as any hiker will tell you, is as good as
another!
102. Kenneth Burke devised the following allegory:
Suppose that a flock of birds, while consorting together, had developed a great
variety in their ways of living. They now sought different foods in different
places, so that the kinds and degree of danger which they incurred varied
considerably. Also, their ways of food-gathering had altered their aptitude for
escape: Some could get away more quickly than others, etc. Those feeding in
trees met dangers which did not concern those on the ground or in the water.
Yet suppose that they still considered themselves a homogeneous flock, and
still clung discordantly together, attempting to act by the same orientation as
they had when living in a homogeneous culture. How would this cultural
mongrelism affect them? Their responses would be thrown into a muddle. The
startled cry of one member would lose its absolute value as a sign. The
placidity of the group in a tree might not any longer be an adequate safety sign
for those in the water. A cry of danger among those feeding on the shore
might no longer indicate similar danger for those in the water or in the trees.
Suppose them at this point endowed with speech. Would they not
immediately begin insisting upon definitions, in order that they might get this
muddle cleared away? Words for danger, safety, food, etc., would not be
enough. A scrupulously critical vocabulary would have to be introduced:
danger under what conditions, food for which members of the flock, etc. Their
old poetic methods of flapping their wings and crying out would lose prestige
among the flock. Only the demagogues or the imbeciles would still resort to
such procedures. The most intelligent birds would insist upon the perfection
of a strict and unambiguous nomenclature.
KENNETH BURKE, PERMANENCE AND CHANGE: AN ANATOMY OF PURPOSE 55-56 (1965).
Burke offers this story to illustrate the situation we are in today, characterized by an
"attempt to erect a communicative medium that will lie across many diverse disciplines,
distinct ways of living, different psychoses." Id. at 56.
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VII. DEFINE YOUR TERMS; OR,
IT'S ALL A MATTER OF SEMANTICS
One rhetorical ploy in the faculty lounge conversation was the
call for a definition of ethics. Someone inevitably asks: "How do
you define ethics?" "How do you define justice? Good? Public
interest?" "Define your terms," she demands. Definitions have a
place when they push a conversation forward or permit a stalled
or ineffectual dialogue to proceed, but in the faculty lounge
conversation the request to define ethics stifles the conversation;
it is a symptom of a way of talking that leads us astray. The plea
for definitions in ethics talk is not, as it might appear, a desire for
rigor and clarity in thinking;0 3 it is a misplaced, unconscious
desire to block moral discourse. In a conversation about how a
good lawyer comes to be considered good, or how a good person
can choose to be a lawyer and do what lawyers do, a demand for
definition pulls the conversation off course. This definitional talk
encourages the fantasy that we can do in legal discourse-say
exactly what we mean and mean exactly what we say-what we
cannot do in moral discourse.
A definition of ethics is like a definition of physics. The
question in physics and ethics is: How does it work? How do
ethics and physics help us understand the world in which we live?
A dictionary definition of ethics, even a good dictionary definition,
gives no more understanding of how ethics works than a manual
on bicycle riding makes it possible to ride a bicycle. We give
words like ethics meaning as we embody them in conversational
action."°4 Our stories, lives, and ethics are more complex than
any definition we might devise for the words we use to describe
who we are and what we find worth knowing about ethics.
103. Jeffrey Stout locates the cognitive problem this way: "Once we know the subtle
details of actual usage [of moral terms], a theoretical definition... is likely to cause more
problems than it solves and unlikely to be both uninformative and nonreductive. It would
be better to have none [no definition] at all." STOUT, supra note 21, at 28.
104. See Elkins, The Pedagogy of Ethics, supra note 98, at 73-74 (criticizing the
impulse to seek definitions as an obstacle to moral discourse).
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VIII. DISAGREEMENT; OR, THE FUTILITY OF IT ALL
We expect disagreement when we engage each other in moral
discourse. Anticipating moral disagreement, we temper our moral
conversations and steer away from ethics talk. We ignore the
common ground we share.10 5  The avoidance of moral conflict
dampens our moral imagination, and erodes the courage and the
truthful speaking that ethics demands. Fear of disagreement can
be translated and symptomized into a stance antagonistic to
moral discourse.
It does not take an education in moral philosophy to realize
that a conversation about lawyer ethics, and the moral judgment
of lawyers, can involve us in disagreement and conflict.' °6 As
lawyers we must each employ, consciously or unconsciously, a
strategy for dealing with the complexity of moral disagree-
ments.' °7 It is disagreement that ethics would have us confront.
There are disagreements-some quite devilishly contrived since
the Devil always seems to have an advocate--about how to
105. To engage in moral discourse requires that we give attention to how and whether
it is possible to stand together, how we share basic aspirations and fundamental beliefs
about the matters we call ethics. We share enough to call ourselves a law firm, a law
school class, a profession, just as we share enough to call ourselves a country. We could
share more, but we often assume that we share far less than we do.
In moral discourse we take as a starting point that we share a language and a world
in which moral language and moral sentiments will be shared as well as disputed. It is
important to keep in mind that we share a language and in doing so share more than we
are likely to admit.
106. See STOUT, supra note 21, at 13-32 (providing an accessible, philosophical account
of moral disagreement).
107. PITKIN, supra note 37, at 153-54:
The point of moral argument is not agreement on a conclusion, but
successful clarification of two people's positions vis-&-vis each other. Its
function is to make the positions of the various protagonists clear-to
themselves and to the others. Moral discourse is about what was done, how
it is to be understood and assessed, what position each is taking toward it and
thereby toward the other, and hence what each is like and what their future
relations will be like. The hope, of course, is for reconciliation, but the test of
validity in moral discourse will not be reconciliation but truthful revelation of
self. "The direct point" of moral discourse... is "to determine the positions we
are assuming or are able or willing to assume responsibility for." Consequent-
ly, again, "what makes moral argument rational is not the assumption that we
can always come to agreement about what ought to be done on the basis of
rational methods. Its rationality lies in following the methods which lead to
a knowledge of our position, of where we stand."
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cultivate ethical sensibilities. We live in a pluralist, fragmented
universe. Talk of ethics and values moves us off the safe terrain
we create with the casual banalities of everyday life.
Our relationship with the disagreements of ethics is like our
relationship with language: there are times when the disagree-
ment is simply part of the reality we accept, and times when the
disagreement suggests the possibility of a reality we must resist.
We hold differing views, and adopt and adapt differing moral
stances, and there will be times when only the most arduous
search will locate the symptoms that block our coming together on
common ground. °8
108. Consider the following story related by Joseph Singer:
When I was in college, I became close friends with someone whose political
beliefs were different from mine. We are still good friends. We disagreed
about certain matters that we considered important. We talked about these
issues a lot, partly because we found them interesting and partly because we
could not understand why we disagreed. Most important, however, we were
close friends, and we each cared a great deal about what the other thought.
After four years of these discussions, I became frustrated because I could not
convince my friend that he was wrong about certain things. He believed things
that I considered, and still consider, morally wrong. I had assumed all along
that if we talked long enough, and that if we were both people of good faith
trying to reach the right answer, we would eventually agree. But we did not
agree.
I found that I had to give up one of the underlying assumptions on which
I had based our long conversations. I could give up the idea that my friend
was intelligent. In that case our disagreement could be explained by his
stupidity. Or I could give up the idea that I was intelligent and explain our
disagreement by my inadequate mental capacity. Alternatively, I could give
up the idea that we were both acting in good faith, that we were both trying
to reach the right answers and were not just playing games with each other.
But I believed that we were intelligent people of good will. I could also
conclude that one or both of us were mistaken about what was right. But this
did not make sense to me. We held our different positions because of values
that were important to us, and I did not see how we could be mistaken about
what was important to us. The only alternative was to give up the final
assumption: the belief that if we talked long enough we would eventually
agree. And that is what I did.
Joseph W. Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1,
38-39 (1984).
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We can treat each other as if we inhabit moral islands °9
and that moral dis-ease will not reach the island we inhabit.
There is something of this moral island imagery in the demand
that each of us, in moral matters, be treated as individuals. Or
we can reduce moral differences to the status of peccadillos,
things we learn to live with, overlook, or disregard. In this view,
moral differences are symptoms that need to be overlooked, not
treated. Steven Tipton warns, however, that "we need to revive
an educative ideal of politics based on truthful argument." 10
109. I have stolen (or thieved, guided by Hermes) the idea of moral islands and
isolation imagery from Thomas Shaffer. See Shaffer, supra note 42, at 231 (presenting
moral isolation as one of three ethical orientations governing lawyer-client conversations).
It would be best to confess here that I am deeply indebted to Thomas Shaffer for going first
in legal scholarship with so many of the ideas I have translated into my own.
110. Tipton, supra note 52, at 173. Tipton, a sociologist, argues that "[mIoral
pluralism is not the cause of the problems we face in making sense of how we should
conduct our lives and our public affairs. And moral absolutism is not the cure for our
problems." Id. at 168. And what is the problem? Tipton describes it this way: "The core
of the problems lies.. . in the cultural overgeneralization of individualism to represent a
sort of moral Esperanto." Id. Individualism creates a "moral imbalance" that "garble[s]
and cut[s] off a cultural conversation that embraces other modes of moral discourse." Id.
Tipton believes that every moral tradition, including individualism, has a
"universalizing nature":
The biblical tradition, for example, enables us to envision how to love and obey
God, not just in worship but in business, politics, and family life as well, so
that these activities too become worship in their fundamental meaning. The
classical republican tradition enables us to extend a principled concern for the
common good and reasoned dialogue regarding it to the whole of life seen as
a forum, not just the academy and the town hall. In contrast, the utilitarian
tradition extends its bottom line from the market to every interpersonal
exchange revealed as a matter of wants and uses with calculable costs and
payoffs. We see ourselves producing and consuming political and cultural
goods, accumulating and investing social and symbolic capital. The romantic,
meanwhile, urges us to "give our all for love,' and the aesthete or dandy
stylishly shows us how to live the whole of life as a work of art.
Id. at 169.
When the moral tradition of individualism exerts its "universalizing nature," it takes
on a life of its own and becomes, in Freudian terms, overdetermined. Thus, although there
are many payoffs in the individualist moral tradition, we learn its cost when we come to
moral discourse:
By overexpanding a vision of public life as a marketplace for competing
interests and an administrative center for distributing utilities, and by
overnarrowing it as a covenantal community and a forum for debating our
common needs, virtues, and ends, we are failing to do justice to one another
and to care for one another as we should.
Id. at 170. Compare Derek Bok: "At bottom, ours is a society built on individualism,
competition, and success. These values bring great personal freedom and mobilize
powerful energies. At the same time, they arouse great temptations to shoulder aside one's
competitors, to cut corners, to ignore the interests of others in the struggle to succeed."
Derek C. Bok, A Flawed System of Law Practice and Training, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 570, 575
Vermont Law Review
With argument-based inquiry and scrutiny, we are going to face
conflict in ethics talk.
Ethics is a constant reminder of the conflicts embedded in our
work and the way we have chosen to live. Ethics talk threatens
us, as legal discourse does not, because it exposes the tension
between law and justice, belief and knowledge, and regard for
others and regard for self. The disparity between our ideals (and
the many ways of speaking the truth of these ideals) and the
reality of how we practice our craft as lawyers is a moral
fault-line that underlies our struggle to talk about lawyer ethics.
If moral discourse is not threatening and unnerving, pointing to
one serious symptom after another, then you might rightly
conclude that you have not been talking ethics at all."'
Knowing what we do about morals and ethics, we must expect
disagreement and argument. However, if moral argument is just
quarreling, then we can dispense with ethics talk as skeptics
implore us to do. Skeptics seek to avoid ethics because it calls
attention to conflicting visions of what it means to be a good
lawyer. They fear that if ethics talk opens the door, we will be
awash in conflicting subjectivities, that moral reasoning is nothing
but a facade for emotion" 2 and personal preference. Skeptics
fear the symptomatic subjectivity of ethics." 3
(1983).
Tipton argues that without recourse to moral traditions other than individualism "we
cannot even adequately understand what it means to be just and caring, nor can we
sustain these virtues as attributes of communities." Tipton, supra note 52, at 170. This
does not mean that we can simply replace individualism with another moral tradition.
Rather, "[w]e must seek to correct the biased belief that individual interests, feelings, and
rights in their utilitarian and expressive sense can tell the whole truth about the meaning
of a good society." Id. Individualism can tell no more of the whole truth of how we might
live as a lawyer than the whole truth about the meaning of a good society. See generally
MICHAEL J. PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS, AND LAw (1988) (describing the use of moral
discourse as, in Tipton's phrase, an "educative ideal of politics").
111. The Socratic dialogues suggest that questions posed by Socrates seriously
threatened some participants in his probing conversations. See, e.g., PLATO, GORGLAS,
supra note 2; PLATO, PROTAGORAS, supra note 2.
112. Paul Tillich makes the similar observation that religion, "banished to the realm
of mere feeling, has ceased to be dangerous for any rational and practical human
enterprise." TILLICH, supra note 98, at 7.
113. To deal with this fear we need to expand, dramatically, our understanding of
subjectivity and its non-pejorative possibilities.
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Subjectivity leads first to healthy skepticism, then becomes
pathological cynicism when moral discourse evokes the kind of
fear of conflict that turns us away from ethics talk. In contrast
to ethics, we put our faith in reason and law with the hope that
arguments can proceed, conflict can be resolved, and that we can
be spared the sickly feelings of inadequacy and futility when
confronted with moral differences. The faith in law as a fantasy
final cure for subjectivity lies in the belief that matters of
difference can be settled, that conflict can be resolved; law
displaces ethics.
All of us, all of the time, cannot share a common sense of the
value of moral discourse. We are not all equally prepared to
engage in moral discourse. We are not all equally healthy, in the
Socratic sense, in mind and soul. In the absence of an authorita-
tive view of what it means to be a good lawyer, we are left with
our symptoms." 4 But to say that no single comprehensive ideal
114. I do not have, and cannot offer, a prescriptive, fully defined set of morals that you
will want to live by. There is no unitary conception of the good lawyer that would allow
us all to be both good lawyers and good persons. The situation should not overly disturb
us:
Through thousands of years the warring schools [of philosophy] have been
unable to demonstrate the truth of any one of them. In each view some truth
is manifested, namely an attitude and a method of inquiry which teach men
to see something in the world. But each one becomes false when it lays claim
to exclusiveness and strives to explain all existence.
JASPERS, supra note 65, at 29.
We say we are a pluralist society and we say it with pride. Tolerance is a value; "live
and let live" is more than a libertarian motto. But when we point to the plural nature of
our society, we also are using it as a defense: what I disdain, another prizes; therefore, my
tolerance precludes me from moral judgment. It is this notion of tolerance that leads to
the conclusion that "it is beyond the capacity of us Americans to engage in productive
moral discourse with one another." PERRY, supra note 110, at 4. Perry finds this
proposition "sobering, even frightening-it presents a bleak, dispiriting vision of human
relations-and ought not to be accepted uncritically." Id.
Perry begins his analysis by asking whether there can be moral knowledge. Id. at
9. Do moral claims have any truth value? The skeptic says no. The relativist says no.
Perry points out that moral skepticism has little currency among contemporary
philosophers, but is still found in American law schools "where some provincial lawyer-
academics continue to subscribe to the outdated morally skeptical views of an earlier
generation of legal philosophers." Id. at 10. What, then, constitutes moral knowledge?
[M]oral knowledge is knowledge of how to live so as to flourish, to achieve well-
being. More precisely, it is knowledge about how particular human be-
ings-the particular human being(s) I am, or we are, or you are, or she (or he)
is, or they are-must live if they are to live the most deeply satisfying lives of
which they are capable, or at least lives as deeply satisfying as any of which
they are capable.
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of the good lawyer is conceivable or that we have no ready-made
guide for moral discourse to form one, does not mean that the
conversation ethics is destined to fail, although it must inevitably
be haunted by the specter of failure."' Even the nastiest of
symptoms serves to guide us back to health.
The certainty we seek in avoidance of conflict makes us
disdainful of moral discourse n. 6  Few are willing to forego
comfort and security for the frustration and conflict that ethics
holds out to us. Who among us has appreciation for discomfort,
anxiety, confusion-exactly those conditions and symptoms that
speak to our moral state of affairs? But just as the symptoms of
psychological and physical disorder have a positive function, so do
the symptoms of discomfort when we find ourselves in moral
disagreement.
IX. PROTECTING OURSELVES AGAINST THE VIEWS OF OTHERS;
OR, How CAN You QUESTION MY OPINION?
One concern as we begin to talk with each other about
ethics-yours, and mine, and the ethics of lawyers more general-
ly-is whether our conversation is a ruse to promote a particular
moral creed about how we are to live as lawyers. The answer is
Id. at 11.
How ought I to eat to flourish? How ought I to live as a moral person to flourish?
Connect the two. We do not avoid all discussion of the former question because different
answers are possible; we have different tastes and combine foods in different ways in
forming our diets. Whatever your diet, nutrition matters in how well you live and flourish.
Cannot the same be said for our moral sensibilities, with moral knowledge forming the
basic necessity from which the variations may arise?
[M]oral knowledge is primarily about what sort of person a particular human
being ought to be-what projects she ought to pursue, what commitments she
ought to make, what traits of character she ought to cultivate-if she is to live
the most deeply satisfying life of which she is capable.
Id.
Although Perry notes that there are different "competing conceptions of flourishing:
egoistic, altruistic, materialistic, spiritual, etc.," the choice we make is secondary in his
"naturalist conception of moral knowledge." Id. at 15, 12.
115. I have attempted to articulate some preliminary thoughts on the role of failure
in moral discourse in a previous essay. See Elkins, Ethics: Professionalism, Craft, and
Failure, iupra note 98.
116. We have a need for certainty, for reassurance that we will get to where we have
set out to go. The subjective, ephemeral, open-ended quality of ethics makes us anxious.
We are afraid to question our purposes and whether the life we choose to live is worth the
cost.
400
Difficulties of Talking Ethics
yes and no. No, ethics talk does not mandate a particular moral
creed. But then, as a lawyer, a professional, a public actor, and
a citizen, you are not free to adopt any creed that suits your
fancy. It would be a contradiction in terms, for instance, for you
to espouse what is immoral (e.g., harming those who seek to tell
the truth) and still claim to be a good person. It is a basic
proposition of moral life that ethical awareness calls for us to
consider harm to others, and if truthfulness requires, admit to our
complicity in the suffering caused by our actions.
117
We should have no illusions about being able to induce or
indoctrinate anyone to accept particular ethical notions and ideas.
We have no power, ultimately, to prevent each other from
becoming the moral persons we have set out to be. Each of us has
the strength and the will to shield ourselves against the onslaught
of peculiar, idiosyncratic, and destructive ideas.1 8 Even so, we
can work together to be on guard when our talk becomes intoler-
ant and we endanger ethics talk with dogmatism." 9
A fundamental premise underlying moral discourse is that
some people live better lives than others. Some of us make better
choices than others. Some have more character. Consequently,
not every notion about lawyering ethics is equally deserving of
acclaim. Some opinions and assumptions about lawyering are
117. Ethics helps us experience and evaluate the harm that follows from choices,
decisions, and actions. Ethics links persons and actions to consequences. We can, with an
education in moral discourse, see that the words and ways of expression that we now
routinely accept as uncontroversial are subject to re-valuation and re-qualification.
118. I assume this intellectual and psychological characteristic to be present, knowing
that, for some, it must be absent. I hold this assumption the way a therapist assumes that
every patient has the capacity to learn to live a better life, the way a parent assumes his
or her child is a good kid, even when empirical evidence points the other way.
119. Dogmatism takes different forms. In one sense, all teaching can be said to traffic
in dogmatism, the dogma of reason and knowledge, set against the dogma of experience
and belief. Teaching requires choice; it requires inclusion and exclusion. If teaching has
any substantive content and the substance is backed by commitment, there will be talk of
dogmatism.
For expressions of a teaching sensibility that engages us about our life projects, while
being dogmatic only about engagement as engagement, see Howard Lesnick, Being a
Teacher, of Lawyers: Discerning the Theory of My Practice, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1095, 1099
(1992) ("[O]ur teaching should be informed by our own ongoing engagement with the
questions: 'Who am I? What am I doing here? What should I do with my life?').
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better than others. The object of moral discourse is to engage in
moral inquiry about the possibilities, constraints, and character
of our moral notions about the good of lawyering.
It is not easy given the world in which we live-it has never
been easy-to determine what constitutes the good. The difficulty
of the task does not mean that we can simply treat every impulse
as if it were a good moral one. We do not because to do so would
be a violation of the moral notion that some morals are better
than others. Thieves have morals, but we don't respect thieves,
and we don't want them teaching our children the morals
associated with their work and their way of life. In moral
discourse we are given an opportunity to re-examine lawyer
ethics, seeing, in a new light, the better and the worst of what we
do as lawyers.
Every person is, as we are all too frequently told, entitled to
his or her opinion. No one who prizes personal and political
freedom would have.it otherwise. A thief is entitled to his opinion
about morality even though from a moral perspective it is a
mistaken one. If we are not to become tyrants to opinions, and by
tyrant here I mean one who has no compulsion to listen to others,
then we must find a way to listen to others (and they to listen to
us) and see if we cannot by reason and passion, 120 rhetoric121
and story, get beyond our settled opinions. If moral discourse is
not to consist of the public airing of opinions, and if some opinions
impoverish our character, what are we to do?
120. DAVID M. RICcI, THE TRAGEDY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE: POLITICS, SCHOLARSHIP,
AND DEMOCRACY 301 (1984) ("a great conversation relies very heavily on time-worn and
emotional terms, many suffering from imprecise character but still carrying enough moral
authority, by precedent, habit, experience, and spiritual commitment, to be capable of
moving many people in the right direction much of the time").
121. There are times when our language is inappropriate, lax, lazy, insubordinate.
Words, as Paul Ricoeur points out: "M]ay also be used so as to say nothing, to gossip, to
lie, to deceive and, lastly, to lead to delirium. Consequently, work may easily put to shame
the word which, it seems, does not make anything. Hamlet speaks of the vanity of speech:
words! words! words!" Paul Ricoeur, Work and the Word, in EXISTENTIAL PHENOMENOLOGY
AND POLITICAL THEORY: A READER 36-65, 52 (Hwa Yol Jung ed., 1972).
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First, a moral person will acknowledge that ethics is not
subjective in the sense that you have your ethics and I have
mine,122 nor is ethics objective in the sense that there is some
definition, prescription, code, set of principles or rules, that fully
describes ethics. Ethics, like the two-faced Roman god Janus,
faces us, at one and the same time, toward subjective and
objective aspects of the good life.
To say that ethics is subjective does not mean that every
moral opinion, idea, and thought constitutes a moral good. We
don't accord the opinions of racists and sexists the same qualita-
tive place that we do those who seek equality. To assume that
every belief is equally valuable would value true and false,
functional and dysfunctional, empowering and disempowering
beliefs equally. A person could not live and function in a civil
society without making moral discernments.'23 As a practical
and political matter we know that every person is entitled to an
opinion, but having the political and legal right to express an
opinion does not mean that we should value bad opinions or take
impoverished notions of the world to heart, adopting them as our
own. If there is, as Socrates argued, a demonstrable difference
between true and false beliefs, then a true belief is more valuable
than a false one. A good opinion is more valuable and useful than
a bad one. If there were no discernible differences in moral
judgment we would have no use for ethics talk.
X. RELATIVISM; OR, MORALS ARE AN INDIVIDUAL MATTER
If each of us has her own approach to ethics and the approach
is personal and idiosyncratic, then all opinions and be-
liefs-regardless of the harm they tolerate-are immune to
criticism and judgment, persuasion and re-evaluation, and
122. The argument that we make up our own ethics, framed by the subjectivity of an
idiosyncratic perspective is, at its extreme, a form of philosophical skepticism known as
solipsism. See NAGEL, supra note 36, at 11 (solipsism is the conclusion that "your mind
is the only thing that exists").
Without the capacity to consider, evaluate, measure, and reflect on what you identify
as your own moral stance, and the harmful consequences of actions taken pursuant to this
stance, then it will be difficult to persuade others that it is indeed a moral stance that you
are taking.
123. See id. at 59-75 (providing a straightforward, philosophical account of how the
discernment of right and wrong is fundamental to philosophy).
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immune to the knowledge that might be gained from listening and
thinking, learning and teaching.
If the moral worthiness of professional practices is not to be
determined by explicit principles or a body of ethical rules (e.g.,
a professional code of minimal moral conduct), how can we know
what is right? If we cast off from the mooring provided by ethical
rules, how can we ever determine what is ethical for a lawyer to
do? What values and ideals will guide our relationships with
clients, other lawyers, and with ourselves? Is every opinion
offered in the name of ethics equally valid? Is every ethical
stance as good as any other? Most simply put, how will we know
what to value, what to cherish?
The students in the seminar I taught were asked to read the
story of Richard Rodriguez, a Mexican-American and self-ac-
claimed "scholarship boy" who mastered academic life at Stan-
ford.'24  Rodriguez's story describes the transformation he
underwent from the familial world of his Mexican-American
childhood to an English-speaking world of middle-class American
manhood. The students have been asked to consider how, and in
what ways, Rodriguez's memory of his transformation evokes
memories of their own gains and losses as they undergo the rites
of passage that lead to initiation into the priesthood of law-
yers. 25
During the discussion of the Rodriguez story, Karen, a
student in the seminar, rejects Rodriguez's narrative because of
what she describes as his bitterness toward his parents and
124. RICHARD RODRIGUEZ, HUNGER OF MEMORY: THE EDUCATION OF RICHARD
RODRIGUEZ 5 (1983).
125. My own exploration of this transformation includes James R. Elkins, Becoming
a Lawyer: The Transformation of Self During Legal Education, 66 SOUNDINGS 450 (1983);
James R. Elkins, Rites de Passage: Law Students 'Telling Their Lives," 35 J. LEGAL EDUC.
27 (1985); and James R. Elkins, The Quest for Meaning: Narrative Accounts of Legal
Education, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 577 (1988).
A political scientist has presented similar accounts. See James C. Foster, Antigones
in the Bar: Women Lawyers as Reluctant Adversaries, 10 LEGAL STUD. F. 287 (1986); James
C. Foster, Legal Education and the Production of Lawyers to (Re)Produce Liberal
Capitalism, 9 LEGAL STUD. F. 179 (1985); James C. Foster, The "Cooling Out" of Law
Students, 3 LAW & POL*Y Q. 243 (1981).
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teachers. She argues that Rodriguez should have been thankful
for the education they made possible. Other students, and the
teacher, are surprised at Karen's reading of Rodriguez. The story
they hear is that, as Rodriguez learned English, he began to
model his life on that of his English-speaking teachers. He
confesses that as an adolescent he was at times ashamed of his
parents' poor English. In remembering his education, Rodriguez
sees that it was his identification with the public world of his
English-speaking teacher and his desire to be a "public man"126
that provided the context for his childhood attitudes toward his
Spanish-speaking parents. Richard Rodriguez's education as a
"scholarship boy" and his assimilation into middle-class white
culture is costly, but it is not clear that his honest evaluation
constitutes bitterness.
Karen becomes increasingly defensive about her interpreta-
tion. "It is," she claims, "just a story and I am entitled to read it
any way I want." What is one to say in response to Karen and
her claim about Rodriguez, whether or not it is misguided? More
problematic, how is her claim about her reading and interpretive
ethic to be regarded by others struggling to understand Rodri-
guez? Is Karen right that stories can be read any way we want?
Her adamant claim that when she reads a story she, with
justification, can read it any way she chooses, is at once a wild,
undisciplined assertion of freedom and a statement of a relativist
interpretive stance.127
One response, the power move (the prototypical law school
move), is to prove that Karen's reading is misguided 128 and try
to demonstrate better readings of the story. I have made the
power move, and it has left me with the troubled realization that
I would have been a better teacher if I had listened more deeply,
probed more fully, and proved less. To listen carefully to the
relativism embodied in Karen's response, I must see a value or
quality in her stance. I must try to hear Karen speaking in a way
126. RODRIGUEZ, supra note 124, at 7.
127. I should point out that Karen's relativism cannot be assessed on the basis of a
single interpretive move. Relativists reveal themselves as they engage us in sustained
moral discourse over time. Karen's relativistic stance was confirmed in her reading of
other texts and other classroom interpretive moves.
128. Ironically, such misreadings of a story push us to see how our subjectivity as
readers and interpreters of texts works.
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that reflects not only her belief, but as the expression of a culture
she brings to her reading. Yet, by attentive listening, I do not
want to confirm silently a narcissistic indulgence of interpretive
relativism that muddles public discourse.
To work with Karen's relativism, therefore, I must know what
I am hearing. To do that I must ensure that I am listening. And
to do that I must know something of Karen and how she comes to
this relativistic interpretive ethic that closes her off to argument
and persuasion. Karen, troubled about the condition of the world,
just as I am, clings to her isolating relativism. Is her relativism
an attempt, perhaps a misguided one, to take a moral stance in
what she fears to be a hopelessly amoral world? 2' If relativism
is a stance of hopeful tolerance in a world of dogmatism, then I
must learn to listen to the rhetoric of relativism with more care
than it often seems to deserve.'30 Relativists may turn out to be
pragmatists whose realism shields them from the trouble-ridden
world that they seek to enter as professionals.
Karen is taken by surprise when her reading leads to talk
about relativism. 13' Karen, like other relativists, assumes that
her argument is intuitively sound and beyond refutation. She
assumes she is telling us something we already know and accept.
Karen's relativism is not a worked out theory, or an explicit,
articulated philosophy, but an embedded, unreflective way of
129. Thomas Nagel suggests something along this line in his observation that "[als a
last resort, those who are uncomfortable without convictions but who also cannot manage
to figure out what is true may escape by deciding that there is no right or wrong in the
area of dispute, so that we need not decide what to believe." NAGEL, supra note 24, at xi.
130. Milton Mayeroff has written:
To care for another person, I must be able to understand him and his world
as if I were inside it. I must be able to see, as it were, with his eyes what his
world is like to him and how he sees himself. Instead of merely looking at him
in a detached way from outside, as if he were a specimen, I must be able to be
with him in his world, "going" into his world in order to sense from "inside"
what life is like for him, what he is striving to be, and what he requires to
grow.
MILTON MAYEROFF, ON CARING 53-54 (Harper Perennial 1990) (1972).
131. Perplexed by the cultural drift toward moral confusion in public life, I consider
education, and my teaching, to be in service of the idea that we must understand Karen
and her rhetorical and moral stance, or we will forever be confused about moral discourse.
The opposition to moral relativism that I envision is not dogmatic opposition; it takes
account of relativism as an experienced truth, a real world ethical dilemma, an ethical
theory, a partial truth that finds its way into moral discourse.
406 [Vol. 17:353
Difficulties of Talking Ethics
seeing the world. Karen herself makes clear that she is being
what she calls "argumentative" and is not articulating a philoso-
phy.1" 2  She argues that she is simply voicing an opinion-one
woman's opinion is as good as another's. The problem is that her
opinion, this day and others, is not just a personal opinion, but a
rhetorical stance with serious moral implications. What begins
with an old adage-one person's opinion is just as good as
another's-becomes for the relativist a way to insulate a stance
against personal and political challenge.'33
Exposing anything personal to public cynicism, in particular
the cynicism that accompanies the law school version of the
Socratic method, poses an imagined, if not real, danger. Another
way to protect what is important-love, family, ethics-is to
withdraw it from the public realm of scrutiny into a private realm
of silence. It is by silence that we make ethics personal and
private. It is true that we may also choose not to talk about
ethics for the reasons we do not talk about justice, civility, love,
friendship because we doubt the sufficiency of language to express
what we feel; or we may doubt our skill at using what language
we have to express our feelings; or we may believe that even
skilled use of language will result in a tangle of misunderstand-
ing. It is difficult to talk about things that matter deeply, to
articulate our concerns about the world and our place in it.
Relativism disguises difficulties we are unwilling to confront.
132. In various encounters with relativists I have found that they take pleasure in
argument and are comfortable in the spotlight. Adept at gaining attention, they are still
wholly unprepared for critical scrutiny of their relativist views. The argument that ensues
when relativism is questioned sounds like verbal ping-pong. The relativist sees it as a
semantic game.
133. To oppose relativism raises the specter of psychological and political dogmatism.
The politics of equality make the equality of opinions a fundamentally unassailable idea
in the eyes of the relativist. The confrontation of the relativist with the counter-under-
standing that some opinions are indeed better than others-that some values are more
significant than others and that some ideals and beliefs lead to a better world than
others-leads the relativist to conclude that claims about the relative value of opinions is
elitist, undemocratic, and totalitarian.
As the relativist becomes more adamant in her claims, the conversation proceeds to
gridlock. Whatever appeal to reason or experience, whatever form the rhetorical response
to Karen takes, she clings ever more tightly to her position. At this juncture the
conversation falters.
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XI. FALSE NECESSITY; OR,
I DON'T SEE How IT WILL EVER CHANGE
We are, in whatever we do as moral actors, either critics or
conformists. A critic tries to see through the world. Conformists
accept the world as it is. We live our professional lives on one
side or the other of the critical/conformity divide. There may
indeed be forays across the divide, alone or in the secure company
of others, and we may fantasize a healthy mixture of
both-"Sometimes I'm critical and sometimes I'm not"-but it can
be no more than a fantasy built atop the moral, political, and
cultural fault-line of the dialectic of criticism and conformity.
We are all, in one sense, conformists. Our embeddedness in
the world of everyday reality pulls us into ethical stances that we
adopt without reflection.1 3 4  There is always someone standing
by to define me, to put and keep me in a box, suggesting that I
take the already marked path. Necessity abounds. The day is
filled with demands labeled as necessity. Our lives are caught up
in the structures, routines, conventions, and traditions we accept
as real and unavoidable. 135  We answer to the system within
134. One phenomenological sociologist described our conformity this way:
The human actor, as a socialized member of society, operates within a
life-world that is pregiven and already organized... : The language he learns,
the culture he acquires, and the social structures within which he lives provide
him with a stockpile of typifications, of recipes for interpreting and acting, and
with a stock of knowledge that forms the basis for even his imaginative
exploration of courses of action other than those he already knows.
The life-world (Lebenswelt) is not only prestructured but the meanings of
the elements contained within it are also pregiven. The stock of knowledge
provides the actor with rules for interpreting interactions, social relationships,
organizations, and institutions. And when the unexpected happens or new
situations occur and the taken-for-granted is thrown into question, only then
is he forced to consider alternative schemes of interpretation.
Thus, within the standpoint of the natural attitude, the individual is not
motivated to question the meaningful structures of his life-world. His interest
is a practical one and his task is to live in rather than to make a study of the
life-world.
George Psathas, Introduction, in PHENOMENOLOGICAL SOCIOLOGY: ISSUES AND APPLICA-
TIONS 8-9 (George Psathas ed., 1973) (citations omitted).
135. While there is much foolish romanticizing of the primitive, I have no doubt that
at some early time in our evolution as cultural beings the ability to experience the present
moment was more easily sustained, and evoked in sacred ritual, than it is today. Or
perhaps that is one of the fantasies that I project onto the past and imagine as a quality
of the primal mind. That some part, if not much of life, is devoted to the sustained effort
to survive in the face of necessity, and its facelessness, is a fate we share with our
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which we work and, in doing so, we become conformists. The
danger is that we do not admit that we are conformists.
We are surrounded with conventions and traditions that cover
us like the blankets we pull around us on a cold night. You may,
of course, reject homely conventions and try to forge a self that is
modern, contemporary, mobile, elastic, protean, secular-in short,
a self that finds little need to talk about ethics. Or, uncomfort-
able with life, fearful of what you see happening around you, you
may retreat and seek a sense of self rooted in established ways.
Some of us immerse ourselves in everyday life and live with
what we are given, living decent lives in doing so. Others want
to change the world, make it safer, more peaceful, and more
aesthetically pleasing. Still others, confused or afraid, resist
change and pledge their lives to unacknowledged conventions.
136
Can we see the world clearly enough to know what kind of
world we are in and how it might change? Is there something
wrong with the world?137 Your stance on this question will find
its way into your ethics talk. You must believe in some funda-
mental way that the world works in the way that it should, or
that it does not.138  We believe in the world and accept it as it
is, or we register our disdain for the way the world works. A
critic resists conformity in the belief that something has gone
wrong with the world. Optimists are of two sorts, those who find
too little wrong with the world or their place in it to seek critical
ancestors.
136. Between these polar stereotypes we find the skeptic who finds the world a mess,
but sees little possibility of repairing the mess and, thus, little patience for talking about
the situation. "I do not," the skeptic says, "have the power to change the world, or a single
person in it. I am powerless. I am weary. I am too disgusted and angry to be of any
help." See PERRY, supra note 110, at 9-10 (explanation of the stances of other skeptics).
137. NICHOLAS RESCHER, ETHICAL IDEALISM: AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND
FUNCTION OF IDEALS 85, 87 (1987) (The quarrel between an optimistic and a pessimistic
appraisal of the world's course is an ancient one. . . . Optimism in all its forms is
indissolubly linked to the dimension of value. All the various modes of optimism are
evaluative positions that contemplate some manner of goodness .... ").
138. It is a stand that tells us something of your philosophy and the place that you
give critical reflection. in your ethics. See Max H. Fisch, The Critic of Institutions, in THE
OWL OF MINERVA: PHILOSOPHERS ON PHILOSOPHY 135-51 (Charles J. Bontempo & S. Jack
Odell eds., 1975) (arguing that philosophy should be viewed as a critique of institutions).
1993] 409
Vermont Law Review
change, and those who seek critical change to justify morally their
optimism.
What, if anything, has gone wrong? If something has gone
wrong, what are the symptoms of our malady? Consider the
following philosophical and rhetorical scenarios we find in ethics
talk:
(i) There is nothing wrong with the way things are now. "I
have a good position, and am in a good situation. I do not want
to undermine what I have achieved." Mark Tushnet responded to
this sentiment with the observation that: "Particular people in
particular societies have interests in maintaining things as they
are. You can talk to them until you're blue in the face about how
they would lead more satisfying lives if they abandoned their
positions of privilege, yet you're not likely to get very far." 39
The other philosophical strand of-"there's no reason to
change"--comes from a semi-explicit social theory: there is
nothing wrong with the way things are now because it is natural
that things exist as they do4" and, even if we turned things
upside down, they would return to the same hierarchial order of
their own accord.
(ii) There is something wrong with the way things are now,
but we must live our lives with what we are given:
The great majority of people in most human societies is
conservative. The reasons for this are not at all mysterious.
Most people are conservative in the sense that they take the
basic structures of their society for granted and try to work out
the problems of their own lives within these structures....
139. Mark Tushnet, Flourishing and the Problem of Evil, 63 TUL. L. REV. 1631, 1648
(1989).
140. In an elegant essay, Robert Grudin observes that:
[M]ost of us go through life assuming that the world, give or take a tree here
or a building there, was meant to be more or less what it is. We tend to accept
the status quo, in general terms, as the limit of possibility. The essence of
inventiveness lies in trashing this assumption.
ROBERT GRUDIN, THE GRACE OF GREAT THINGS: CREATIVITY AND INNOVATION 22 (1990)..
Ethics talk, done well, requires inventiveness.
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This conservatism is typically unreflected, not given to
theorizing, self-assured rather than defensive in tone.""
We can change what is wrong only when we know how to fix
it. Until we know how to fix what we know is wrong, there is
nothing to do. There is simply no program, ideal, or vision that
adequately explains how to fix things and make a better world.
Until a reform program is spelled out and given a high probability
of success, we should not attempt to change things-even if
something is wrong. And, whatever may be wrong, things are
getting better.
142
(iii) There may or may not be something wrong with the
present situation. We don't have to decide finally whether
something is wrong because those who seek change cannot be
trusted. "The problem is that I don't trust those who diagnose the
problem and want to change things. The people who want to
change the world are just as bad as those who want to keep it the
way it is now. When you turn the world over to those who seek
radical change, they put themselves in power and then go about
business as usual."
Others, uncertain about the present situation and the need
for change, have a psychological aversion to change. "I just don't
like constant change. Stability, certainty, and predictability are
important to me and even if our situation is not perfect (is it all
that bad?) it is better to continue as we are than to try to change
things."
(iv) There is something wrong, but to change it only creates
problems. "We have to think about the consequences of change.
We may not like things as they now exist but there are others
who do, and they have power. If we make the changes necessary
to make the world work the way we want it to work, we will incur
the wrath of the powerful and they will interfere/impede/block our
changes." Or a bleaker scenario: "Those who have power will
take notice of the changes we seek and punish us in unimaginable
141. PETER L. BERGER, FACING UP TO MODERNITY: EXCURSIONS IN SOCIETY, POLITICS,
AND RELIGION 107 (1977).




ways. To change what we now know to be bad will retard the
slow progress we have been making.""4
A variation of this view accepts that things need to be
changed, but fears that change has the potential to turn against
us and make matters worse. Stability and certainty, even with a
bad situation, reduce the risk that things might become worse.
We vary widely in our ability to cope with uncertainty and to take
risk. On this point, Roberto Unger notes that:
We ordinarily admit into our thoughts only that measure of
seemingly disordered reality to which we can give an active
response. To limit the perception of reality is the natural
strategy of intellectual survival: the mind fears being over-
whelmed by more than it can imaginatively order. But unless
we occasionally move at the edge of our imaginative capabili-
ties we cannot hope to extend our vision of reality and to refine
our conception of how things may be ordered.1"
(v) There is something wrong, but there is neither time,
energy, nor resources to change it. This view builds on the idea
that there is both good and bad in what we do. Although the bad
may predominate, and need changing, we also do much that is
good, and in doing the good we expend our energy and exhaust
ourselves. "Do the best you can with the good and suffer the bad,"
they tell us. In doing so we participate fully in the inevitable
compromises of modern social institutions. "Yes, things are in bad
143. We are reminded by Frank Michelman that:
The result of confrontation is unpredictable: it might be incomprehension,
denial, or repudiation. Or it might be progress. If you ask me, the odds on
progress are not favorable. That, however, is not a reason for not trying if
there is nothing much to lose. And what is there to lose?
Frank I. Michelman, Conceptions of Democracy in American Constitutional Argument:
Voting Rights, 41 FLA. L. REV. 443,490 (1989). Michelman, drawing on his revisionist civic
republicanism, posits a "dialogic conception" of the self in which "a person's identity is
partially constituted by that person's social situation, and personal freedom accordingly
depends on a capacity for self-critical reconsideration of the socially embedded ends and
commitments that partly make one who one is." Id. at 450; see id. at 443-52 (providing a
dialogic, self-constitutive theory of politics); C. Edwin Baker, Republican Liberalism:
Liberal Rights and Republican Politics, 41 FLA. L. REV. 491,514-15 (1990) (observing that
"[c]ommunicative action is central to our identities, as well as to deliberative politics" and
that the "conception of a person as a being who engages in communicative action,
therefore, both leads to liberal supra-political rights and implies the necessity of an
everyday politics that is, at least in part, deliberative and constitutive").
144. UNGER, supra note 9, at 87.
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shape, but we have to be realists. We must do what we can and
make the best of it. Life is not a bed of roses." Here we see a
pragmatic assessment of the possibility of change that combines
a sense of realism (what is possible) and futility (we can't change
it).
(vi) There is something wrong, and it must be changed slowly
through negotiation with those who oppose change. There are
those who see clearly how a situation works and can articulate
the nature and basis of needed change, and yet ally themselves
with those who oppose change. The reformer believes that things
must change, but that all change must take place within the
terms and conditions established by those who resist it. Change
is compromised because it proceeds only upon agreement with
those in power and is implemented in a way so that no one in
power is threatened.
Thomas Shaffer and Stanley Hauerwas, in a beautifully
crafted essay on Sir Thomas More, observed how power is an
incentive to delusion about change.' 45 Compromise is the sweet
name we give our giving in to power. Lawyers are asked to
compromise, Shaffer and Hauerwas observe, because power seems
to offer a way to improve society:
Lawyers are always being asked to bend a little, so that power
can work, and things can be made better; lawyers are always
being told-always telling one another-that the essence of
their profession ... lies -in working within the system. They
are always being told that someone has to do the job, that if
they don't do the job, someone worse will do the job. Things
have to be done in office that cannot be done with moral
comfort in private life, but that is the way office (including the
license to practice law) is.
... It is important, first, to notice that we are talking about
a compromise with truthfulness, a compromise demanded of
public persons, which comes about because the person who
makes the compromise is optimistic. It is important, second,
to notice what we mean by compromise. It is not compromise,
in this sense, for the public person to adjust his views to the
views of others when there seems to be no clear right or best
145. Hauerwas & Shaffer, supra note 86.
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thing to do-when, in other words, he needs their views as
much as they need his, when all of those most immediately
involved are seeking truth. It is not compromise... to commit
oneself to the discovery of the truth through a willingness to
share the variety of ways people discover when they set out to
lead good lives. What we mean by compromise is an agree-
ment to bracket one's basic convictions in order to achieve
certain limited ends. Compromise... assumes that the good
society is based on power. Compromise is . . . to be distin-
guished from respect and civility, and even the concessions
people make when they work together on the assumption that
the good society is based on truth.... [Clompromise asks the
loss of self; it also destroys the possibility of good societies.
Compromise is destructive because it becomes institutional-
ized and accepted as a proper way of life. When that happens,
the distinctions between the public and the private... become
a sign of despair. The distinctions come to say that the social
world cannot be held together by truth. A society afflicted by
the syndrome of the two kingdoms [the effort to erect compart-
mentalized worlds of public and private morality) raises up
leaders who have trained themselves to believe that their
public roles are their selves, who define themselves by roles
(e.g., the role "lawyer"). They are compromised before they
enter the fray. When this happens, as it may well have
happened to us Americans, it is no longer honest to distinguish
between the public and the private person .... There is no
private person left. Power, as requiring the surrender of the
private person, is what... [we are] struggling with. Power
threaten[s] the private, adamantine sense of self ....
Here, virtue is a tangled trail through a dark forest. The
practical man or woman of affairs tends to believe that it is
egocentric not to make such a compromise. Refusal seems to
betray hope (optimism), for to be unwilling to compromise is to
cease to be effective, and it is important to be effective. (The
way power corrupts is by gradually convincing those who have
power that the most important thing is to be effective.)...
How does truth affect change and bring about transformation
if it succumbs to power or is defeated by it? Why bother with
truth? Or ethics? No one sets out to be a loser. There is, as the
146. Id. at 581-82 (footnote omitted).
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late Robert Cover suggested, a very real danger "that the gulf
between the redeemed world [reality] and the unredeemed [the
yet unrealized vision of a future world] will [not] be bridged...
by our committed practical behavior.
" 147
(vii) There is something wrong and we tried to change it and
failed. "We must now live with what we've got. Radical change
has, as always, failed. We must live with the situation as it is."
The "change failed" scenario, or resigned realism, lies in a sense
of tragic resignation that preconditions us to accept the inevitabil-
ity of failure.
(viii) There is something wrong, but it doesn't matter one way
or the other whether we try to change it. "I really don't care
whether we do anything or not. It's all the same one way or
another." In cynicism, denial masks the ignorance of indifference.
(ix) There is something wrong, but this is not the time or the
place to fix it. "Let's wait. We can start tomorrow. Now is not
the best time. When the time is right we will change things."
"Why do today what will wait until tomorrow? It will eventually
get done." Procrastination is elevated to a virtue.
(x) There is something wrong, but we don't have the courage
to fix it. Clarence Kelly, the former director of the FBI, relates
how FBI agents' fear of J. Edgar Hoover thwarted change. 4 '
Robert Sherrill summarized the situation:
Nobody ever told Hoover the truth, says Mr. Kelley, because
to do so might upset him; besides, if you showed too much
savvy, Hoover might see you as a rival and get rid of you.
Apparently Mr. Kelley was as intimidated as the rest of the
crew. He admits that, "on many occasions I saw the opportuni-
ty to initiate changes that would have produced better investi-
gations by the Bureau" but "my experience with headquarters'
officialdom cautioned me against any departure from FBI
147. Robert M. Cover, The Folktales of Justice: Tales of Jurisdiction, 14 CAP. U. L.
REV. 179, 197 (1985).
148. See Robert Sherrill, The Bureau and the Bureaucrat, N.Y. TIMES BOOK REVIEW,
Sept. 13, 1987, at 12 (reviewing CLARENCE M. KELLEY & JAMES K. DAVIS, THE STORY OF
AN FBI DIRECTOR (1987)).
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norms. Essentially, I did what others had done before, and
rocked no boats."149
The danger of not acting on the impulse to change the world and
ourselves is cynicism and decay. 50
(xi) There is something wrong, and when we change ourselves
we will change the world. Erich Fromm argued that we can
change human character if we suffer and are aware that we do;
recognize the origin of our ill-being; recognize that there is a way
of overcoming our ill-being; and accept that to overcome our ill-
being we must follow certain norms. for living and change our
present practice of life.15'
XII. EPILOGUE: A TROUBLED JOURNEY
When we engage in ethics talk in conversations about the
world in which we actually live as lawyers, we begin to see how
paradoxical, difficult, obstacle-strewn, and symptom-laden moral
discourse turns out to be.
You can sort out, when confronted with moral discourse, what
you hear and your feelings about ethics, and, using old mental
maps, judge ethics talk to be impractical and worthless. Or you
can use ethics talk to trace the magnetic outlines of the moral
terrain that push and pull lawyers to and fro in their work.'52
The old maps you use to judge ethics talk may turn out to be
invaluable, but you cannot know that until you explore the terrain
149. Id.
150. The danger of the impulse to change others and the world is dogmatism.
151. FROMM, supra note 54, at 155.
152. What I have in mind here as an antidote to conventional magnetic moral forces
is described by Anthony Cook in his survey of the critical moral elements of the world-view
of Martin Luther King, Jr.:
[W]e must meet and talk together, appreciating our respective histories and
experiences of alienation and oppression. We must talk specifically about the
kind of community we would fashion and how the rules, laws, and rituals
defining the roles we adopt can be mutually empowering and facilitative of a
community of equals. We must talk specifically about how we should organize,
protest, agitate, and struggle to achieve our objectives, realizing that we are
perennially engaged in a dialectic in which the program shapes our practices,
which in turn refine and redefine our program.
Cook, supra note 63, at 1044.
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and evaluate your map(s) against the life you and other lawyers
live. One might, from a stance of suspicion or faith, pursue moral
inquiry to see what it might teach about the maps we have made
of the moral universes we inhabit.
We want reassurance that ethics is a good map for the real
world. Although there are maps-ways of life, moral principles,
and religious beliefs-that provide abundantly clear directions to
moral pathways we might follow, many of us take up ethics with
the idea that we must draw the map for ourselves.'53 To live
the lives we want to live we attempt to re-draw the moral maps
we have inherited. We assume the freedom to re-forge old ethical
sensibilities because we mistrust those who would impose their
ethics on us.
There is no readily available map that charts the moral
terrain of contemporary professional life. Sound judgment,
concern for others, sincerity, and authenticity are essential
elements of professional character, but law school bookstores don't
sell reference books on how to develop these virtues or deal with
those who lack them. There is no authoritative map or guide to
show us how ethics can be made central to the practice of law and
how we are to form agreements about a good life (or live a good
life in the absence of moral agreement as to its nature). Moral
discourse cannot, then, help us discover a true map or establish
a set of final prescriptions for how to be a good lawyer, or
negatively, how to avoid being considered an unethical lawyer.
But there are many who hold adamantly to the necessity of just
such a discovery.' Otherwise, they wonder, why talk? Moral
discourse, like any conversation, is not predestined to lead us one
153. We play loose and free with this imagined freedom to configure a new ethics of
the day. The problem is that our ongoing, everyday, flexible, self-made ethics becomes, not
just situational, but solipsistic and relativistic.
154. Bernard Williams points out that "[olne reason why conservatives and
traditionalists attack reflection [the reflection encouraged by moral discourse] is that they
fear the uncertainty that seems to follow from it." WILLIAMS, supra note 66, at 168.
1993] 417
418 Vermont Law Review [Vol. 17:353
place or another. 5 5  In moral discourse we find out where we
are going as we get to where we should be.
156
Regardless of the map we use, it is hard to do ethics, to talk
ethics, to take ethics seriously. In response to the invitation of
moral discourse, some are silent. Some are silent because they
assume ethics talk is futile. Others because they fear that
expressions of moral concern in some way will be used against
them. There is a fear of disapproval, of revealing an inner
weakness. Finally, there are those who have social and political
agendas that are best promoted by the secrets of silence.
Some seek, with their silence, to protect vulnerable ideals,
beliefs, and values. There are times when we do not have a voice
to speak of things that matter most to us. Personal faith and
beliefs are vulnerable to the rough treatment of public exposure.
Silence has many faces.
15 7
155. The uncertainty will be unacceptable to some. They posit goals for themselves
because they cannot imagine being without a predetermined destination. Lloyd Weinreb,
speaking of his effort to provide a new explanation of natural law said, "I have tried to
provide something of a map and frequent road signs; but the destination can only be
announced and is not fully in view until journey's end." LLOYD L. WEINREB, NATURAL LAW
AND JUSTICE viii (1987). So it can be said of moral discourse and the conversation ethics.
As in all philosophy, "[tihe answer has to be discovered, or established, as the result of a
process, personal and social, which essentially cannot formulate the answer in advance,
except in an unspecific way." WILLIAMS, supra note 66, at 200 (arguing that we answer
the most serious philosophical questions through reflective living).
156. There are no guarantees that moral discourse actually will make us into good
persons, or that it will get us where we want to go. The conversation ethics exposes the
fear that we do not actually know where we are going and that where we want to go may
turn out to be less than desirable. For example, life on the lawyer fast track may turn out
to be costly-witness the high levels of dissatisfaction with the legal profession now being
voiced by young lawyers.
157. Paul Goodman observed that:
There is the dumb silence of slumber or apathy; the sober silence that goes
with a solemn animal face; the fertile silence of awareness, pasturing the soul,
whence emerge new thoughts; the alive silence of alert perception,, ready to
say, "This... this.. ."; the musical silence that accompanies absorbed activity;
the silence of listening to another speak, catching the drift and helping him be
clear; the noisy silence of resentment and self-recrimination, loud with
subvocal speech but sullen to say it; baffled silence; the silence of peaceful
accord with other persons or communion with the cosmos.
GOODMAN, supra note 46, at 15.
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Some are subtle in their opposition to moral discourse.
Ridicule is a common response. Others become dismayed,
confused, and angry, and resist the inquiry into lawyer ethics.
They do not want to hear that we must all suffer ethics talk.'58
We must suffer because the conversation ethics uncovers the
neurotic baggage we bring to ethics talk and the moral trou-
ble--confusion, anger, perplexity-that underlies the drift of our
culture. 9
Ethics, in one fashion or another, inevitably makes its
appearance in our lives and conversations, sometimes disguised,
and when ethics arrives, unannounced, it makes trouble.' We
experience ethics as difficulty. Ethics and ethics talk, depending
on how we live, make life unpleasant because we do not welcome
difficulty. We do not know how to see or to use the difficulty of
ethics, with its myriad symptoms, as telling us something about
our lives as lawyers, indeed, something about our world and our
culture. We blame the futility of ethics talk for our confusion and
sense of impotence to change, to focus more directly on the good.
A journey into ethics talk will be deeply troubling if you bring
to it the kind of law-trained mind and psyche that shuts down
whenever you hear the word "ethics." If you follow the bent of
your law-trained mind and assume that the only way to study
lawyer ethics is to study a body of ethical rules and the law of
158. Maurice Natanson refers to this suffering as a kind of anguish: "[Ainguish may
be understood as the threat of placing in fundamental question everything which assures
our placement in the world. The force against philosophy can be measured by two
components: first, the protection of common sense against "outside" invasion; second, the
insulation of common sense against "inside" erosion." NATANSON, supra note 36, at 15.
159. The moral perspectives we adopt are perspectives offered and pressed upon us by
the world in which we live. See JOEL KOVEL, THE AGE OF DESIRE: REFLECTIONS OF A
RADICAL PSYCHOANALYST (1981) (exploring the socially shaped dynamic of our neurotic
baggage).
160. With the turn to ethics talk, we are asked to re-evaluate and re-think what we
have assumed to be beyond question. We lose a friend or a spouse. We experience some
big or little failure. A colleague betrays us. Someone we trust breaks a promise. Or, we
fail ourselves in some way that cannot be denied. There are times, then, when we become
painfully aware of what we have taken for granted, times when we are forced to recognize
what we have become and we see the toll our choices have taken in our own lives and in
the lives of others. See, e.g., TOLSTOY, supra note 97. When the noisy party ends we are
left with the truth and with ourselves. Our own ethics-accepted, operating on automatic
pilot, half-hidden and forgotten, embedded and mythic-keep wandering into our lives,
claiming their due, demanding attention, making their way onto center stage and into our
scripts, and stories, and becoming a part of our professional lives.
1993] 419
Vermont Law Review
lawyering, then you may feel lost and angry when the conversa-
tion centers on moral discourse. If you are threatened by the
possibility that the practice of law poses a set of moral problems
as well as moral possibilities, then you may find yourself hostile
to an inquiry into lawyer ethics using moral discourse. If you
measure what you hear about lawyer ethics by the folk wisdom of
adversarial zeal, you can expect trouble. If you are threatened
when your ethics are challenged, you may find it difficult to
participate in moral discourse. If you are angered, threatened, or
outraged by the critique of professional practices and the ad-
versarial ethic that emerges from moral discourse, you may
become defensive of both the legal profession and the choices you
feel compelled to make in the name of what you now call "ethics."
Ethics threatens our unreflective lives. The threat is
especially pronounced for those who assume that the adversarial
ethic and its excesses are morally excused by our professional
role. Ethics makes the lawyer role and the ways of thinking
attributed to the adversarial mindset, the subject of talk and
critique, claim and argument, lament and condemnation. 6 '
Ethics turns out to be the burr under the adversarial saddle we
lawyers ride, sometimes in self-assured comfort, sometimes
(secretly) knowing that we should be walking rather than riding.
Ethics constitutes an obstacle in our headlong rush to adopt
uncritically a legal persona, legal mindset, and legal voice. Ethics
is a potent enemy to those who wear the lawyer mask uncritically
and who hope to ignore the harm that lawyers do in the name of
zealousness and professionalism, all the while calling themselves
"ethical."
Ethical inquiry and moral discourse will, unless we find a
way to circumvent moral concerns, stop us in our tracks, block
well-worn paths, interrupt ongoing assumptions and unexamined
161. Lawyer ethics is found in the language of condemnation and exhortation, as well
as justification. We use ethics to condemn those who have gone astray; we extol
professionalism to bolster the misshapen public image of the profession. We defend
against the public rhetoric of condemnation and its assault on lawyer practices with a
rhetoric of moral justification to soothe our moral concerns about the adversarial ethic. We
turn to ethics for solace (the rhetoric of justification), spiritual absolution (the condemna-
tion of those who stray from the moral path and the elevation of those who "make it" to
the status of heroes), and image boosting (speeches bolstering the value of law and
lawyering).
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practices. Ethics interrupts the certainty and security we desire
for our taken-for-granted lives. Ethics challenges those who
would practice law as an unreflective and unexamined life.
Moral discourse demands that we confront ourselves about
the ethical worlds we now inhabit. We confront ourselves in
moral discourse because ethical talk exposes the parade of
conflicts in the roles and lives held out to us as exemplary, as well
as those in our own lives. Moral discourse is a dramatic work of
revelatory conversation about how to be a good person and a good
lawyer.
162
Some fear that a lawyer who wants to succeed cannot afford
to worry about virtue and character, about ethics. Some find the
idea of ethics quaint, others conclude that ethics is absolute
nonsense. There are some who find ethics not only alien, but
subversive and dangerous because ethics questions established
conventions about the role of lawyers and their adversarial ethic.
162. The characterization of conversation as a dramatic work follows Alasdair
MacIntyre's observation that our conversations "belong to genres in just the way that plays
and novels do" and have "beginnings, middles and endings just as do literary works. They
embody reversals and recognitions; they move towards and away from climaxes. There
may within a longer conversation be digressions and subplots, indeed digressions within
digressions and subplots within subplots." MACINTYRE, supra note 53, at 196; see MARTHA
C. NUSSBAUM, THE FRAGILITY OF GOODNESS: LUCK AND ETHICS IN GREEK TRAGEDY AND
PHILOSOPHY 378-94 (1986) (explaining Aristotle's use of drama, especially tragedy, in moral
education). Kenneth Burke notes that "[in great eras of drama, the audiences know why
characters act as they do. The characters themselves may be in a quandary, but the
audience has merely to see them act and hear them talk, and the motives are taken for
granted." BURKE, supra note 102, at 32. Burke argues that tragedy is at the roots of the
ethical life:
Tragedy is a complex kind of trial by jury in which the author symbolically
charges himself or his characters with transgressions not necessarily
considered transgressions in law, and metes out condemnation and penance by
tests far deeper than any that could be codified in law. Since tragedy is
essentially concerned with the processes of guilt and justification, every full
religious expression touches upon tragedy .... Tragedy reveals most clearly
the workings of the criminal and expiatory processes implicit in human
relationships. And it particularly concerns the complexities of ethics and
psychology because of the close connection between tragedy and purpose. We
might almost lay it down as a rule of thumb: Where someone is straining to
do something, look for evidence of the tragic mechanism.
Id. at 195.
For Aristotle, the defining features of tragedy were pity (eleos) and fear (phobos). See
WALTER KAUFMANN, TRAGEDY AND PHILOSOPHY 50-56 (Anchor Books 1969) (1968). "The
most distinctive and universal feature of Greek tragedy was that immense and overwhelm-
ing suffering was presented to the audience." Id. at 373.
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In the conversation ethics, it is possible to hear the unexpect-
ed 16 3 and be asked to confront matters we do not fully compre-
hend. For some, the conversation ethics will be familiar and
friendly. For some, it will seem alien and bizarre. For many, the
conversation will result in confusion, discontent, and anger.
Ethics talk can at times sound strange;'4 it can be frightening
to learn what those who purport to be good people will do. Some
moral choices articulated in the guise of being an effective
lawyer-choices articulated in the law school classroom, choices
we see being lived out around us-are reprehensible. It is not
always clear where the conversation ethics will take us.
We cannot talk ethics without a struggle. Yet, some see no
purpose in the struggle of ethics talk. Others do not believe their
ideals and beliefs as lawyers should be puzzled over in public
conversation. There is the fear of self-exposure and that minor
deceits, personal failings, and unconscious self-deception will be
exposed. When we talk ethics, we expose ourselves and the
fundamental notions we have formed about the world and our
strategies for dealing with the world.
I know of no way to do ethics, to engage each other in ethics
talk, that does not leave us, at times, dismayed, baffled, and
perplexed. In searching for what is morally worthwhile, we face
uneasy hesitations, silences, confusion, anxiety, disavowals, and
denials. The conversation ethics is often a muddle and a mess.
The conversation about the moral and ethical dimensions of
a life in law will take us on a rather long and arduous journey.
163. Or hear what was not said, or hear so little of what was said that an effort at
elaboration results in distortion.
Moral discourse is sometimes like the parlor game where a group sits in a circle and
one person whispers a message to the person next to him in the circle. The game proceeds
by each person in turn repeating what he heard to the next person in the circle. The
payoff in the game is the shock when the last person repeats what he has heard after it
has traveled its way around the circle of speakers and listeners. When we speak to each
other in our capacity as lawyers, the effect is only slightly less dramatic than in the game.
Unable to confine our conversations, dialogues, and communications to simple, direct,
unequivocal directives-"This is the law; this is what the law reqires"-we learn and
relearn the now familiar adage that the message sent is not necessarily the message
received.
164. NATANSON, supra note 36, at 10 ("Self-consciousness . . . is rather strange
precisely because the flow of our action is stopped and the scene of our involvement itself
becomes explicit to reflection.").
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On this journey, all of your symptoms, including those that upset
you most (and especially these), are part of the drama and
learning that make the journey memorable. As we talk and learn
ethics, we see the limits of our adopted character, our moral
reasoning, and our professional voice. We cannot participate in
moral discourse and hide from each other our vulnerabilities,
mistakes, and failures. A sense of disquietude, frustration,
confusion, and anger can be instructive and can deepen under-
standing of what it means to be a moral lawyer. If, as seems
inevitable, we become confused and go astray, we at least can be
forewarned of our fate.
165
165. Even if we cannot say where our ethics talk about moral matters will take us and
what we will ultimately do with what we say and hear, we can value those moments of
clarity when we see the interconnectedness of our lives and work and the moral muddles
that befall us. It is clarity that clients want from lawyers and are willing to pay to get.
Clarity is not only a matter of legal training and an intellectual virtue, but a moral virtue
honed in moral discourse.
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